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ABSTRACT 
The traditional action-response perspective has largely ignored the role of 
language in competitive dynamics. In this study, I treat language (i.e., word response) as 
an alternative way to react to rivals when a firm is attacked, in addition to no reaction and 
action-based reaction. Word response is a specific and public announcement of a focal 
firm’s potential move in reaction to a competitor’s word or action attack. To explore the 
underlying mechanism behind word responses, I aim to answer two major questions. The 
first question is under what situations are responders motivated to use words as 
competitive responses? For this question I emphasize characteristics of the action, the 
market, and the actor, using measures such as action type, market dependence of the 
responder, multimarket contact of the responder in the market, and the competitive 
aggressiveness of the actor. The second question is what kinds of responders are more 
likely to use words as competitive responses? For this question, I focus on responder 
characteristics, such as firm reputation, CEO tenure, and CEO duality. According to 
Porter’s competitive signaling theory, I argue that responders can use words in reaction to 
an attack in order to test the waters, deter rivalry, and demonstrate toughness because 
word responses require few resources, can be accomplished quickly, are reversible, while 
at the same time still carrying some commitment. Besides incorporating language into the 
action-response perspective, my dissertation also further integrates the upper-echelons 
perspective with competitive dynamics research, providing a more realistic and complete 
understanding of competitive engagement. I test my theory in the consumer electronics 
(CE) industry with 20 major global CE manufacturers between 2007 and 2014.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation and Research Questions 
Studies on the actions and reactions of firms have been an influential body of 
research in strategic management for over a decade (Chen & Miller, 2012; Smith, Grimm, 
& Gannon, 1992). Firms can gain advantages over competitors through actions, while 
those advantages can be eroded through reactions from competitors if they respond in 
time and effectively (Porter, 1985). Compared to macro-organizational phenomena, 
competitive dynamics (CD) scholars are particularly interested in this micro-behavioral 
viewpoint and focus on exploring antecedents and consequences of competitive actions 
or responses (Chen & Miller, 2012). For example, Smith and colleagues’ (1992; 1991) 
seminal works suggest that characteristics of the action, the actor, the environment, and 
the responder are all important determinants of competitive response. Their action-
response model has become a cornerstone for much CD research (e.g., Chen, 1996; 
Ferrier, Smith, & Grimm, 1999; Marcel, Barr, & Duhaime, 2011; Young, Smith, & 
Grimm, 1996) 
However, the extant CD literature has considered actions as the only type of 
competitive behavior. A key argument in action and response research is that when a firm 
(the actor) initiates an action that challenges a rival’s competitive position, its rival (the 
responder) can choose not to respond at all, or to respond with an action if the responder 
is aware of the challenge, motivated, and capable of responding (Chen, 1996; Chen & 
MacMillan, 1992). Yet, besides responding with action, top executives may also respond 
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verbally to defend the firm’s market position after an attack. For instance, after 
McDonald’s introduced McPizza in selected restaurants to test the market in 1989, Pizza 
Hut immediately announced that “‘every place you see a McDonald’s pizza, you’re going 
to see a war” (Shapiro, 1989). As Porter (1980) noted, responders can use language to 
indicate their intent to retaliate, which may deter the actor from following through with a 
planned move or lead to the withdraw of a move already taken. 
Therefore, the overriding objective of my dissertation is to understand the 
competitive use of language as a response based on the action-response perspective. 
Rooted in Austrian economics and influenced by industrial/organization economics and 
game theory, competitive dynamics research has paid very limited attention to the role of 
language use in competitive interaction. One exception is Rindova and colleagues’ (2004) 
paper, which makes an important contribution by discussing how language can be used to 
engage employees and stakeholders in competitive settings by drawing their attention and 
shaping their minds into an enemy mode.  But the focus of their study is mainly how 
language influences the perceptions of stakeholders and it does not consider direct 
competitors. In this dissertation, I aim to study the role of language in direct competitive 
engagement and incorporate it more closely with the literature on competitive actions and 
reactions. 
Perhaps the major reason why scholars have tended to ignore language use in CD 
is because they implicitly assume that talk is cheap and thus not to be taken seriously.  In 
economics, the term “cheap talk” refers to costless, nonbinding, and non-verifiable 
communication among players to a game (Farrell, 1987). Crawford and Sobel (1982) 
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argue that if the incentives of two parties are not aligned, the communication between 
them will quickly reach a “babble equilibrium” in which the content of language is totally 
irrelevant.  Cheap talk theory predicts that language does not affect the payoff of a game 
when the information receiver believes the sender has incentives to lie.  Obviously, 
competitors, by definition, have conflicting interests.  Following the reasoning of cheap 
talk theory, language from competitors will be ignored by firms and thus be of no value.  
Yet, there are several reasons why I believe this conclusion is incorrect.   
First, as Porter (1980) noted, language from competitors is often not just bluffs, 
but can include viable commitments and warnings.  It is important for a firm to 
understand what its rival might try to do next or what the rival expects the firm to do next, 
even though there is a possibility that the language is deceptive, because ignoring signals 
from competitors is the same as ignoring competitors altogether (Porter, 1980).  My 
contention is that language-based actions and responses can carry important information 
about rivals, thus they should not be ignored.   
Second, talk becomes more important to the extent that the information revealed 
is verifiable and/or has longer-term consequences for the talking firm and its stakeholders.  
I think that the implications of public statements for firm and managerial reputations 
work to bond the speaker to the statements.  For example, a market leader can enjoy a 
strong reputation for releasing credible information for coordination among rivals (Ferrier, 
1997), while firms that frequently issue false or misleading statements find their 
statements completely discounted (Kim, 1996; Stocken, 2000).  Because a false 
announcement can be costly when information is verifiable or becomes verifiable (Farrell, 
  
4 
1987), the implications of verbal communication can fuel concern about future losses 
from damaged reputations for not providing accurate information, leading to care in 
making statements (Kim, 1996).  
Further, it is easy to observe examples of firms that, when challenged by a rival 
with an action or a word action, choose to respond verbally via a variety of channels, 
such as technology conference interviews, industry journals, business newspapers, or 
earnings conference calls with securities analysts. Therefore, I think it is crucial to 
achieve a better understanding of the role of language in CD, particularly the issue of 
word response, a competitive use of language as a way to defend firm market position. 
I define word response as a specific and public announcement of a focal firm’s 
potential move in response to a competitor’s word or action attacks. Word response 
expresses a responder’s intent to retaliate although in a reversible way. According to 
Porter (1980), pre-move announcements are important competitive signals.  Word 
responses can serve as preemptive gestures or threats, warning the rival that an 
announced action, if taken, will lead to a swift and painful retaliation.  By doing so, a 
verbal response can express a firm’s commitment to retaliate as a threat to the attacker 
and to deter further attack. 
To clarify the definition of word response, it is important to note that word 
response is not an announcement of an action that has already occurred (e.g., in 
responding to firm A, firm B acquired firm C yesterday) or an announcement of a 
concurrent action (e.g., a competing product will be available on the market 
today/tomorrow; contracts have been signed today to build a new plant in city xx).  
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Researchers commonly use such public statement to identify actions. I intentionally leave 
these public statements outside the scope of my research because they “leave one in such 
a position that the option of nonfulfillment no longer exist” (Schelling, 1960).  Such 
announcements are, in effect, action responses, but not word responses.   
There are two major reasons why I study word response in competitive dynamics. 
First, as I noted above, word response is not costless cheap talk and should not be ignored 
by either competitors or scholars. Second, I believe there are different underlying 
mechanisms between using word response and action response. For example, word 
response may be strategically more desirable when the responder feels the need to 
respond but does not want the response to escalate into a war.  Under such circumstances, 
a word response will convey the intended message to the rival without causing any 
financial harm.  It is my belief that a word response, when used properly, may even 
subdue the enemy without an actual fight. Moreover, compared to language, actions 
might be too costly or too late to be effective (Moore, 1990).  For instance, a word 
response noting that “we are mulling over adding capacity [in a rival’s home territory]” is 
less costly and quicker than actually building a plant.  
However, CD scholars have largely ignored those differences between words and 
actions. Although Ferrier and colleagues did take overt signaling into consideration when 
they measured actions (Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier, Fhionnlaoich, Smith, & Grimm, 2002; 
Ferrier & Lyon, 2004), they did not provide different theorizing to separate words and 
actions. Here, I assert language can be an alternative competitive tool for a firm to 
communicate with competitors and word responses can be an alternative form of 
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competitive response compared to action response and non-response. Building on the 
traditional action-response perspective, my dissertation aims to extend the CD literature 
by addressing the following research question: 
When (under what conditions) is a word or action attack more likely to induce a word 
response? 
I integrate word attack and word response into the traditional action-response 
model proposed by Smith et al (1992) and focus on some conditions that make the word 
response more likely to occur. I suggest that action type (strategic action relative to tactic 
action), market dependence of the responder, multimarket contact (MMC) of the 
responder in the market, and competitive aggressiveness of the actor are possible 
important determinants of word response.  
First, compared to tactical actions (e.g. price cuts, promotions, distribution and 
service improvements), strategic actions (e.g. capacity changes and major product 
introductions) require more time and more commitment of resources to respond (Chen & 
Miller, 1994; Chen, Smith, & Grimm, 1992; Smith et al., 1991). Previous CD research 
suggests that strategic actions are less likely to evoke competitive responses because the 
responder need more time to figure out what is going on (until uncertainty removed) and 
more implementation efforts to realize it (Chen et al., 1992). Contrastingly, word 
responses are quick and require few resources allocation. Further, a pre-announcement of 
retaliation can test the waters and help the responder better understand the 
opportunity/threat carried with the strategic action. 
In addition to action type, MMC of the responder in the market is also suggested 
to influence the likelihood of word response. MMC refers to a situation in which two or 
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more firms compete with each other in more than one product or geographic market (Yu 
& Cannella, 2012). The notion of “mutual forbearance” argues that firms competing 
against each other in multiple markets will hesitate to compete aggressively because the 
cost of warfare across multiple markets is too high (Edwards, 1955). Competitors are 
motivated to respond if there is high level of MMC, in other words, a high level of 
interdependence, because the attack may be taken as a betrayal to the “mutual 
forbearance”. However, a competitive war across multiple markets is very costly. A pre-
announcement is less risky and may also perform the warning function, informing the 
rival that an action “crosses the line”. Further, word responses are quicker than action 
responses and a quick response signals a stronger commitment to defend a market 
position. 
Similarly, I also suggest that the market dependence of the responder may 
increase the likelihood of word response. Market dependence is the extent to which the 
responding firm relies on the market(s) affected by an action (Chen & MacMillan, 1992). 
Evidence suggests that the more dependent the market under attack, the more likely the 
attacked rival will respond and match the initial action. The theoretical explanation for 
this observation is that actions initiated in strategically dependent markets pose direct 
threats to a responder, increasing its motivation to fight back (Chen & Miller, 1994; Chen 
et al., 1992). However, an action response in such a setting could be very costly and risky. 
If the cost of retaliation exceeds the benefits, an action response may not be feasible 
(Chen & Miller, 1994). Rather, a word response may be a good choice because a) it can 
carry commitment and be used to threatening; b) it is associated with low risk with regard 
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to provoking an all-out war. 
Lastly, I consider an actor attribute that is often discussed by CD scholars usually 
as a predicted value —competitive aggressiveness. Competitive aggressiveness refers to 
the extent to which a firm defends its market position with actions. Two important 
dimensions are action volume and action complexity (Yu, Subramaniam, & Cannella, 
2009). Research has shown that a firm that is aggressive in carrying out more and faster 
competitive actions than rivals will exploit more opportunities and close off more 
potential for rivals to retaliate. A tagged “aggressive attacker” indicates both its strong 
willingness and capability for a head-to-head competition (Clark & Montgomery, 1998). 
Such an actor will be less likely to halt an attack after receiving a signal from the 
responder. Makadok (2010) concluded that firms with superior capabilities tend to ignore 
mechanism of a rivalry restraint. Instead of interpreting word response as an attempt of 
rivalry deterrence, there is good possibility that aggressive attacker will interpret a word 
response as an aggressive move (not a defensive move) and initiate more attacks. 
Therefore, the responder may take this actor attribute into consideration and be less 
motivated to use word response when the initiated action came from an aggressive rival. 
By focusing on characteristics of the responder, my dissertation also aims to 
explore the following research question: 
What factors associated with the responder affect the likelihood that a word response 
will be enacted? 
Besides exploring when a firm is more likely use word response as a response, it 
is equally important to understand what firms are more likely to use word response. In 
other words, what kinds of firm/CEO characteristics are related with the likelihood of 
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word response? Building on the signaling literature and upper echelons theory, I suggest 
three antecedents: firm reputation, CEO tenure, and CEO duality. 
First, firm reputation refers to “stakeholders’ perceptions about an organization’s 
ability to create value relative to competitors” (Rindova, Williamson, Petkova, & Sever, 
2005). Reputation has been well recognized as an important source of competitive 
advantage (Basdeo, Smith, Grimm, Rindova, & Derfus, 2006; Hall, 1992). Many studies 
have demonstrated a positive relationship between firm reputation and firm performance 
(Deephouse, 2000; Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Roberts & Dowling, 2002). Although firm 
reputation is very closely related with stakeholders, but I believe it also have implications 
for competitive behavior. For example, building on signaling theory, Basdeo and 
colleagues (2006) suggest that market actions and competitors’ actions are closely related 
to firm reputation. The more actions a focal firm takes, the more information available for 
stakeholders to reduce perceived uncertainty, thus the more positive impression formed 
by the stakeholders. On the other side, the more actions taken by a rival, the more 
attention is diverted from the stakeholder and the more potential cost (retaliation cost) 
associated with a focal firm’s action, thus the less likely for a positive impression formed 
by the stakeholder about the focal firm. Therefore, I think firm reputation is also closely 
related to word responses, and include it into my model. I argue that firms with good 
reputations are more likely to leverage the good impressions of stakeholder because the 
firms (the responders) know their words are relatively more powerful and credible to the 
actor. In other words, with a good reputation, there is more potential for a word response 
to successfully substitute to an action response. Moreover, a word response provides 
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more information than non-response, thus enhance reputation building by reducing 
uncertainty for the stakeholder. 
In addition to firm characteristics, I also investigate some CEO characteristics by 
incorporating upper echelons theory because (1) CEO characteristics can reflect a firm’s 
strategic choice about competitive response; and (2) CEOs or other top executives can 
issue word responses in the form of talk at technology conferences, interviews, or 
earnings conference calls. Two CEO characteristics I explore in this dissertation are CEO 
tenure and CEO duality. 
CEO tenure has been proposed as a key influence on strategic choices (Hambrick, 
1984). Upper echelons scholars argue that more experienced CEOs are better at 
leveraging existing knowledge and resources to exploit opportunities (Hambrick & 
Fukutomi, 1991; Miller, 1991). More experienced CEOs are more familiar with the rules 
of the game and the effects of their own strategic choices. Compared to non-response and 
action responses, word responses are competitive behaviors that exploit firm-level 
intangible assets such as reputation as a credible defender. In addition, several studies 
found that long-tenured CEOs are more likely to pursue Miles and Snow (1978)’s 
“defender” strategy, rather than “prospector” strategy. For example, Barker and Mueller’s 
(2002) study showed that CEO tenure was negatively associated with R&D spending. 
The longer CEOs stay in their position, the more strategic emphasis on stability 
(Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009) and the less aggressive they became. Word 
response is desirable because it may tone town rivalry to keep the stability of the 
competitive environment and it is not an aggressive response to the actor. Therefore, I 
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suggest that CEO tenure is positively associated with the likelihood of word response. 
Besides the main effect of CEO tenure on word response, I will also discuss how 
CEO tenure changes the relationship between action type (strategic action vs. tactical 
action)/MMC/market dependence and word response. Upper-echelon research has 
suggests that long-tenured CEOs are more reluctant to initiate strategic change 
(Finkelstein et al, 1999). Similarly, I argue that the long-tenured CEOs are less motivated 
to respond with strategic action response because strategic action associated with more 
uncertainty and changes than tactical action. Instead, long-tenured CEOs are more likely 
to use word response, an alternative competitive response, when the initiating action is a 
strategic action rather than a tactical action. Upper echelons research has also shown that 
long-tenured CEOs are negatively related with risk-taking (Miller & Shamsie, 2001). 
When an attack occurs in an important market or the attack initiator has a high level of 
MMC with the responding firm, the responder does not want to risk provoking all-out 
war in an important market or multiple markets. Compared to an action response, a word 
response is less risky. Therefore, I suggest that longer tenured CEOs are more likely to 
use word response when market dependence is high or MMC is high.  
CEO duality is another well-studied construct in upper-echelon research and has 
been widely discussed in corporate governance practice (Krause, Semadeni, & Cannella, 
2014). CEO duality occurs when a CEO also serves as the board chairman (Finkelstein & 
D'Aveni, 1994). Similar to CEO tenure, there is no clear conclusion about the 
relationship between CEO duality and firm performance, but it is generally agreed that 
CEO duality indicates more CEO power (Krause et al, 2014).  My prediction of the 
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likelihood of word responses is consistent with the awareness-motivation-capability 
(AMC) framework, which argues that action responses are a function of the extent to 
which the responder is aware of the action, is motivated to respond, and is capable of 
responding. CEOs with more power increase their capabilities to speak publicly and 
reveal their firms’ intentions for the next move. Thus, I suggest that CEO duality is 
positively associated with the likelihood of word response. Lastly, I also suggest a 
moderation effect on CEO duality. That is, dual CEOs are more likely to use word 
responses when market dependence is high, when MMC is high, or when the action is 
strategic. 
1.2 Contribution 
My dissertation aims to make the following three contributions.  
First, I incorporate the role of language into CD research using the foundational 
action-response framework, expanding its range to include word response. Building on 
organizational information processing theory, Smith and colleagues (1992) developed the 
action-response perspective to explain how a competitive action can evoke responses 
from rivals. However, language, an information-exchange tool, has seldom been 
considered in CD research and we know little about why and how managers use language 
as a tool in competitive engagement. The integration of language into CD also refines the 
AMC framework. My study helps to explain why action responses are not always 
forthcoming even when the responder is aware of the attack, motivated to respond and 
capable to respond with actions.  
Second, my study contributes to research on upper echelons and corporate 
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governance by further integrating CEO characteristics with competitive behaviors. For 
both CEO tenure and CEO duality, the effects on firm performance are not conclusive. 
Upper-echelons scholars have noted that the relationship between CEO tenure and firm 
performance is very complicated (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991; Simsek, 2007) and 
corporate governance scholars claim that CEO duality is one of the two “contemporary, 
and intensely contentious issues related to the governance of publicly-traded companies” 
(Dalton & Dalton, 2011, p405).  A possible resolution is to look at more proximal 
consequences, and I consider the propensity to use word response is one of these. For the 
CD literature, there are already some studies to link upper echelons to competitive 
activities (Chen, Lin, & Michel, 2010; Cho & Hambrick, 2006; Hambrick, Cho, & Chen, 
1996; Marcel et al., 2011; Smith et al., 1991), but few studies have examined at the role 
of the CEO in the response decisions. In a review paper, Chen and Miller (2012) also 
noted that it would be interesting to study how CEO shape competitive behavior.  
Third, my dissertation contributes to the signaling literature, including studies on 
reputation. In his seminal work, Spence (1973) defined signals as information that is 
observable and costly to imitate. Building on signaling theory, management scholars have 
mainly focused on the information exchange between managers and important 
stakeholders (Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2010). For instance, research has 
shown that managers can signal unobservable quality via observable firm characteristics 
(e.g. board structure and CEO certification) to gain legitimation or enhance reputation 
(Certo, Daily, Cannella, & Dalton, 2003; Deephouse, 2000; Zhang & Wiersema, 2009). 
Studies on reputation are mainly drawing from Spence’s school of signaling theory, 
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namely signaling theory. Concentrating on the role of signals in a competitive context, 
the competitive signal perspective endorsed by Porter and a few marketing scholars 
suggests that signals can be any moves that carry competitor information, including both 
words and actions (Heil & Robertson, 1991; Moore, 1990; Porter, 1980). In my 
dissertation, I adopt Porter’s view of a competitive signal to study word response and 
incorporate the role of reputation, a construct rooted in signaling theory. I argue that 
stakeholders’ impressions are not only important for the focal firm to gain support from 
stakeholders but also represent an important predictor for competitive behavior. 
1.3 Overview of Research Method 
My model of word response is tested using a sample of 20 global consumer 
electronics (CE) manufacturers from 2007 though 2014. The sample selection is based on 
both theoretical and practical considerations. Theoretically, the industry of CE is selected 
because firms in this industry have a high degree of interdependence and the industry is 
well known for intense competitive interactions. An oligopolistic setting is a basic 
assumption for studying action and response because competitors need to be aware of 
each other’s moves and can be influenced by each other’s moves. Practically, there is rich 
public information about competitive behaviors (including both words and actions) in the 
CE industry. Managers in this industry are relatively more vocal than other industries 
because of environmental dynamism and high managerial discretion. The CE industry 
includes eight market sectors: computers and peripherals, mobile phones, televisions, 
home audio and cinema, video players, imaging device, portable players, and in-car 
entertainment. The 20 CE manufacturers are selected according to their sales rankings in 
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each market sector (source: EuroMonitor). I include manufacturers that are top 5 and 
whose sales comprise at least 5% of a market sector in any given sampling year.  I 
consider those 20 CE manufacturers as representing all major players in the CE industry 
(see Table 1). 
Data about action-based and word-based competitive moves are collected from 
Raven Pack (an archival database for Dow Jones news), Factiva, and firm websites (e.g., 
press releases and annual reports). I use structural content analysis to identify those 
competitive activities. Cox proportional hazards regression models are employed to test 
the hypotheses generated from the theoretical model of word response with the 
occurrence of word response comprising my centered dependent variables.  
1.4 Organization of the Dissertation 
The reminder of my dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 is the 
literature review on CD (including action-response studies and multimarket research), 
upper echelons perspectives (including integration of upper echelons perspective and 
competitive dynamics, and signaling-related research (including signaling theory and 
competitive signaling theory). In Chapter 3, a model of word response is developed. 
Based on the well-known model of action-response, four attributes of the actor, the action, 
and the market (i.e., action type, multimarket contact, responder’s market dependence, 
and competitive aggressiveness of actor) are proposed to explain when a word response is 
more likely to occur, while three attributes about the responder (i.e., reputation, CEO 
tenure, and CEO duality) are proposed to explain which responders are more likely to 
choose a word response. Figure 1 shows my full model of word response. Nine 
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hypotheses are developed, including the main effects and moderation effects. Chapter 4 
presents the research methods used for hypotheses testing, including sample selection, 
variable measurement, and statistical analysis. Chapter 5 presents the results of 
hypotheses test. In Chapter 6, I discuss limitation and implications of my dissertation and 
identify some future research directions.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Competitive Dynamics (CD) 
Rooted in Schumpeter’s (1934) concept of creative destruction, competitive 
dynamics (CD) is an area of study that is focused on firm competitive behaviors as the 
primary research object, rather than firm financial performance (Baum & Korn, 1996; 
Smith et al., 1991). CD scholars are particularly interested in the interactive and primarily 
purposeful process of competition.  In general, CD literatures include studies focus on the 
dyad of action-reaction (i.e., the action-response model) and studies on multimarket 
competition. Both areas aim to explore the antecedents and consequences of competitive 
interactions, in order to answer how firms compete, why they compete in such a way, and 
how competition influences performance (Ketchen, Snow, & Hoover, 2004). 
2.1.1 Action-Response Studies 
The origin of the action-response perspective  
Consistent with Schumpeter (1934, 1950) and Porter’s (1980) argument that 
creative action will elicit reaction from rivals in an attempt to destroy the transient 
advantage created by the first mover, the action-response perspective argues that it is 
important to study competitive actions and responses because competitors can benefit 
from predicting rival’s behaviors and postponing rival’s retaliations. Action-response 
scholars claim that day-to-day competitive behaviors cannot be inferred from annual firm 
financial statements, and that the traditional “strategic choice perspective” (e.g., Miles & 
Snow, 1978) and Porter’s “structural perspective” fail to capture the dynamics of actual 
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strategic interactions between firms. Although game theorists are interested in modeling 
and predicting competitive behaviors, game theory cannot realistically capture 
competitive actions and responses in a single model because competitive actions and 
responses are too rich and full of possible combinations (Kreps, 1990). Moreover, game 
theory assumes “common knowledge” between players, while in actual competition, 
“players were unclear on what others would do, how they would behave, and what were 
their motivations” (Kreps, 1990, p138). The above benefits and limitations contribute to 
why Smith and colleagues move to the level of actual action and reaction and focus on 
the information transfer between players. 
Drawing on communication-information theory (Shannon & Weaver, 1949), 
Smith and colleagues (1992) explain how a competitive action can evoke a response from 
a rival as a message is transmitted from a source to a receiver. This research reveals that 
an action response1 (a market action taken by a competing firm to defend or improve its 
position) can be predicted by different competitive contingencies, such as characteristics 
of the actor (the entity initiating the competitive action), the action (a specific and 
detectable competitive move, such as new product introduction or price cut), the 
competitive environment (the context in which the actions take place), and the responder 
(the rival firm which is affected by the competitive action). The action-response 
perspective provided a foundation for understanding different antecedents of action 
responses for later CD studies. Next I will review both antecedents and consequences of 
competitive actions/responses (also see Tables 2 and Table 3).  
                                                 
1 I use the term “action” or “action response” in reference to traditional competitive actions – those that 
involve externally observable market-oriented moves made by firms to improve their competitive positions 
(e.g., price cuts, product introductions).  In contrast, “word action” or “word response” refer to language-
based competitive moves.   
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Antecedents of actions/responses   
Given the significance of action responses, it is not surprising that considerable 
research has focused on a myriad of predictors of action responses.  Regarding the actor, 
Smith et al (1992) argued that rivals are more likely to respond to the market share leader 
(supported), imitate the market share leader (supported), and respond with faster speed 
when attacked by market share leader (not supported) because the market share leader is 
closely watched by rivals, enjoying a favorable reputation for successful expansionary 
capability and the ability to exploit market opportunities, and oftentimes an opinion 
leader in the industry. Besides market share leaders, their study also identified that actors 
with long-tenured top management teams tend to be more predictable for rivals and thus 
evoke fewer action responses (supported), longer response times (supported), and less 
imitation (not supported). Smith and colleagues also suggested that actor’s history as a 
price-cutter or strategic player could help predict action responses. They argued price-
cutters tend to have more responses (not supported), shorter response times (supported), 
and higher rates of imitation (supported), while strategic players tend to have less 
responses (not supported), longer response times (supported), and lower rates of imitation 
(supported). 
Regarding the action, MacMillan, McCaffery and Van Wijk (1985) applied 
Allison’s (1971) decision-making model and proposed several important antecedents of 
action response lag, including the visibility, the perceived potential, the strategic type, the 
complexity, and the radicality of the action and the new product’s misfit with 
organization. They found that except for visibility, all other antecedents loaded on two 
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fairly distinct factors—strategic pressure (including perceived potential and perceived 
strategic attack) and organizational inertia (including radicality, complexity and 
organization misfit). While strategic pressure was found to accelerate response speed, 
organizational inertia was found to delay action response. Both MacMillian et al’s and 
Chen and Miller’s (1994) studies showed that high visibility and low levels of difficulty 
of action were especially likely to evoke responses from rivals. Similar to MacMillan et 
al’s (1985) notion of strategic pressure, Smith et al (1992), Chen and MacMillian (1992) 
and Chen and Miller (1994) also found that the more important the market under attack to 
the responder, the more likely an action response will be forthcoming. Compared to 
tactical actions, strategic actions are less likely to provoke response because the 
information carried with strategic actions is uncertain and unfamiliar. For example, firms 
tend to wait and see when a competitor introduces a new product, but tend to respond 
quickly to tactical actions, such as price cuts. The effect of the action type on the 
likelihood of action response has received empirical supports from several studies (e.g., 
Chen et al., 1992; Smith et al., 1992). CD scholars also noted that the implementation 
requirement of an action is also an important antecedent of action response. The more 
difficult a competitive action is to perform the less likely rivals will respond to the action 
(Chen & Miller, 1994; Chen et al., 1992; Smith et al., 1992). 
Chen and MacMillan (1992) developed the concept of action irreversibility and 
argued that the higher the cost of reversing an action, the less likely that it will provoke a 
action response. Chen, Venkataraman, Black, and MacMillan (2002) further investigated 
the construct of irreversibility through two dimensions—internal commitment (e.g. 
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resource relocation) and public commitment (e.g. industry publicity)—and found that 
internal and public commitments had opposite effects on action response likelihood, 
response lag, and likelihood of matching the initiating action. For example, from a 
behavioral point of view, they argue that 1) actions with high internal commitment 
represent strong signals for not backing down and are less likely to be withdrawn even if 
rivals respond, and thus rivals are not inclined to respond to such actions; 2) actions with 
high internal commitment are rarer than actions with low internal commitment because 
firms tend to use standard procedures to respond to stimuli, and thus for actions with high 
internal commitment, responders need to use responses with non-standard procedures, 
which they do not like; 3) actions with high public commitment indicate high visibility, 
and thus responders are more likely to be aware of such actions and more likely to 
respond; 4) actions with high public commitment invite more attention and scrutiny from 
the external community, and thus rivals experience more pressure from external 
community to respond to such actions. The concept of irreversibility is important for this 
dissertation since word response, as I define, is low on internal commitment and high on 
public commitment. 
Regarding the market/environment factor, there are only a few studies that have 
directly tested the effect of environmental characteristics on action responses. By using 
six dimensions of environmental factors, including dynamism, uncertainty, complexity, 
resource scarcity, homogeneity, and interconnectedness, Smith et al (1992) explored the 
effect of three generic industry types: emerging growth industry (e.g. electronics 
manufactures), fragmented industry (computer retailer), and mature industry (e.g. 
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domestic airlines). They found that firms in emerging growth industries tend to respond 
more, with slower speed, and less rate of imitation than firms in fragmented and mature 
industries. Ferrier and colleagues (2002) found that, although contrary to their prediction, 
performance-distressed firms competing in competition-buffered industry contexts (high 
entry barriers and high industrial concentration) are more likely to compete aggressively. 
Derfus et al (2008) have examined the moderating effect of two environmental 
characteristics: industry concentration and industry demand. Based on the evolutionary 
perspective, they argued that actions could spur responses because competitors need to 
search, act, and learn in order to improve performance. In more concentrated industries, it 
should be easier for rival to learn the action-performance relationship, but their results did 
not support this moderating effect. In addition, they found that in high demand industries, 
actions would spur less action responses because high-growth environments provide 
more opportunities for searching and learning, and thus limit the negative effect (e.g. 
market share erosion) of action on rivals. 
Regarding the responder, small firms are less responsive to attacks and slower to 
respond (Chen & Hambrick, 1995). Responders with external orientation are more likely 
to respond and respond faster, while responders with structural complexity are less likely 
to respond (Smith et al, 1991). Smith and colleagues (1991) also found empirical support 
for their hypothesis that management teams with less industry experience are more likely 
to respond and respond early relative to experienced teams. But their findings do not 
support the prediction that responders with unabsorbed slack are more likely to respond. 
This may be because firms might consider the slack as a buffer between the focal firm 
  
23 
and environmental change and thus there is less need to change. Hambrick, Cho, and 
Chen (1996) found that firms with heterogeneous top management teams (TMT) (i.e., 
functional, educational background, and tenure heterogeneity) are less likely to respond, 
and slower at responding. They also found that firms with larger TMTs responded less 
frequently than smaller ones. Ferrier et al (2002) found out TMT heterogeneity is 
negatively related with competitive aggressiveness under condition of financial distress. 
By adopting a cognitive perspective, Marcel, Barr, and Duhaime (2011) proposed another 
responder characteristic that might help predict action response—the managerial 
cognitive framework of strategic importance. If managers link a certain type of attack 
with poor firm performance in their minds, they are more likely to respond to such attack. 
To review the action-response studies, I also need to mention the AMC 
framework proposed by Chen (1996). Motivated by literatures on organizational change, 
learning, and decision making (Allison, 1971; Dutton & Jackson, 1987; Lant, Milliken, & 
Batra, 1992; Schelling, 1960), Chen describes three necessary conditions for a 
competitive response, those are, responders are aware of the action, motivated to respond, 
and capable at responding. This theoretical framework has identified an important 
assumption in action and response studies: competitive asymmetry between any pair of 
competitors. Unique pre-battle competitive relationships can help predict rivalrous 
behavior in the market. For example, Chen (1996) proposed that market commonality and 
resource similarity should negatively relate to likelihood of competitive response. Young, 
Smith and Simon’s (2000) findings basically have supported these arguments and found 
that as multimarket contact increases, competitors respond less frequently but faster and 
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that resource dissimilarity is positively related to both frequency and speed of 
competitive response. (I will review multimarket competition in detail in the next section). 
In sum, the AMC framework is an important perspective in CD and has been cited quite 
often recently as a framework for explaining why firms respond certain ways or do not 
respond at all. (Haleblian, McNamara, Kolev, & Dykes, 2012; Livengood & Reger, 2010; 
Yu & Cannella, 2007) 
Consequences of actions/responses 
Consequences of actions/responses are also an important research area in action 
and response studies. Interest on the consequences of competitive moves centers on firm 
performance. Consistent with the Austrian school’s prediction that firms need to 
continuously compete in order to recreate advantage, Young, Smith, and Grimm (1996) 
found that firms who implement more competitive activities than competitors (all others 
in the industry) over the course of a year enjoy better firm performance. Similarly, Ferrier 
(2001) tested how competitive aggressiveness (measured by attack volume, attack 
duration, action complexity, and unpredictability) influence firm performance, and found 
that attack volume and duration contribute to market share gain. Lee, Smith, Grimm, and 
Schomburg’s (2000) study on long-distance telecommunications, personal computers, 
and the brewing industry showed that the faster of the new production introduction the 
higher abnormal return (e.g. first and second mover advantage. Ferrier and Lyon (2004) 
found that competitive repertoire simplicity—the tendency of firm to concentrate on just 
a few central activities—is negatively related to firm performance.  
Aggressive responses can also lead to better performance by blocking the success 
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of competitors’ actions (Porter, 1980), or by limiting the later movers’ potential success. 
For example, Chen and Miller’s (1994) study showed that action response ratio is 
negatively associated with firm performance, while controlling for the benefit of action 
response. Lee et al (2000) found out that the second mover can also enjoy advantages (a 
greater shareholder wealth effect than late movers) and that the faster the action response, 
the more erosion/less duration of the first mover advantage. Derfus et al’s (2008) study 
also showed that the number and speed of rival firm actions has a negative impact on 
focal firm performance. 
Limitations of the action-response perspective  
Although the action-response model has been developed from communication-
information theory and discussed a myriad of factors that can help predict competitive 
behavior, language, an important information-exchange tool, has been largely ignored. As 
shown in Figure 2, I incorporate language-based actions and responses into the traditional 
action-response model. Ferrier (Ferrier, 1997) is one of the few scholars who have 
recognized the potential of language-based action. He defined “overt signaling” as “a 
proclamation or `tough talk' made by representatives of the firm found in the media” 
(Ferrier, 1997). The short paper is published in Corporate Reputation Review, but it has 
attracted little attention from CD scholars. By testing market leaders and challengers in 
14 industries, Ferrier confirmed his argument that overt signaling from leaders could help 
sustain industry leadership and preserve abnormal returns. However, this study provides 
limited theoretical explanation about why managers want to use overt signaling and how 
such overt signaling can influence competitor’s behaviors. In his later works, Ferrier and 
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his colleagues also include overt signaling as a type of action but there is no theoretical 
argument associated with this special type of action (Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier et al., 2002; 
Ferrier & Lee, 2002; Ferrier & Lyon, 2004). Similar to Ferrier, Chen (1996) has also 
noticed the potential of signaling action and mentioned in the discussion part of his 
seminal paper, researchers should study issues like market signal, strategic commitment, 
and bluffs in CD. Therefore, I consider my dissertation is answering these calls to build a 
theoretical foundation for the role of language in CD. 
2.1.2 Multimarket Competition  
Multimarket competition describes a situation where the same firms compete in 
more than one markets (e.g. geographic market or product market) (Karnani & 
Wernerfelt, 1985). Edward (1955) proposed the mutual forbearance hypothesis, which 
argues that firms that meet in multiple markets are hesitant to compete vigorously with 
each other because the cost of all-out wars may exceed the prospect for market gain. 
Multimarket contact (MMC), a measure to capture the extent of overlapped markets, 
indicates the level of mutual forbearance. The higher level of MMC, the higher 
possibility of tacit collusion (mutual forbearance). Therefore, a central theme of 
multimarket competition research is to study the relationship between MMC and mutual 
forbearance effects. In this section, I will review multimarket competition literature 
around this theme: the relationship between MMC and rivalry intensity and the boundary 
condition of this relationship (see Table 4).  
MMC and rivalry intensity  
Due to asymmetry of information, resources, and market conditions, firms need to 
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constantly take offensive and defensive actions in order to achieve advantage against 
each other. According to economic and ecological theories, firms with high levels of 
market overlap are fighting for similar resources under similar market conditions and thus 
these firms will compete more aggressively than those with fewer market overlaps 
(Aldrich, 1979; Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Porter, 1980; Scherer & Ross, 1990). 
However, multimarket competition scholars argue the opposite: the closest competitors 
may not be the most aggressive competitors. If a firm (A) encounters another firm (B) in 
multiple product or geographic markets (high level of MMC), they are likely to temper 
their aggressiveness because of the fear of multiple market retaliation (Baum & Korn, 
1996). If a firm (A) encounters another firm (C) in a single or a few markets (low level of 
MMC), firm (A) is more likely to engage firm (C) as they compete with similar resources 
(Barnett, 1993) and there is no mutual forbearance. In general, the mutual forbearance 
hypothesis indicates that the higher level of MMC, the lower the level of rivalry intensity.  
There are several assumptions behind the mutual forbearance hypothesis. 
Bernheim and Whinston (1990) point out that MMC cannot increase the benefits of 
cooperation if markets are identical, firms are identical, and returns to scale are constant. 
Moreover, two other conditions for mutual forbearance to take hold are oligopolistic 
settings and firm coordination across markets. First, firms in oligopolistic settings are 
more interdependent. They are more aware of each other’s moves and more influenced by 
the moves. Only in such settings is it possible for firms to leverage the threat of 
multimarket retaliation as a way to reduce rivalry. In other words, firms need to recognize 
their extended interdependence in order to be threatened by MMC (Gimeno & Woo, 
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1999). Second, coordination across markets is the theoretical basis for the mutual 
forbearance effect (Baum & Korn, 1999; Golden & Ma, 2003; Yu et al., 2009). When 
attacked, firms need to be capable of retaliating at a desired market (e.g. a market where 
the potential loss is bigger for the attacker than for the focal firm). Those assumptions 
and conditions are generally taken-for-granted in multimarket competition research.  
In earlier works, multimarket competition scholars have supported the mutual 
forbearance hypothesis by using performance as an indicator of interfirm rivalry (Evans 
& Kessides, 1994; Feinberg, 1985; Gimeno & Woo, 1996; Heggestad & Rhoades, 1978; 
Hughes & Oughton, 1993; Scott, 1982). Later, researchers have started to examine the 
effect of MMC on rivalry per se—studying actual firm-level competitive behaviors. 
Baum and Korn (1996) used market entry and market exit as indicators of rivalry 
intensity and found a negative relationship with MMC. Boeker and colleagues (1997) 
also found that firms with high MMC are less likely to exit markets. Young, Smith, 
Grimm, and Smith (2000) found that firms with high levels of MMC are less likely to 
initiate attacks, but are quicker to respond when attacked. They argue that when firms are 
attacked, those with high levels of MMC have more to lose by not deterring defections 
from forbearance than those with low levels of MMC. By extending multimarket 
competition into global setting, Yu and colleagues (2009) also confirmed the effect of 
MMC on rivalry reduction (MMC is negatively associated with competitive 
aggressiveness). Regarding action responses, Yu and Cannella (2007) found that firms 
with high levels of MMC are faster to respond when attacked, consistent with Young et 
al’s study (2000). 
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While the traditional multimarket competition theory predicted a linear 
relationship between the level of MMC and rivalry intensity, some papers have identified 
a curvilinear relationship between them. In Baum and Korn’s later work, they found an 
inverted-U shaped relationship between MMC and rivalry intensity (Baum & Korn, 
1999). They argued that firms at first are motivated to increase the level of MMC in order 
to achieve the benefits of mutual forbearance, a level also called “mutual forbearance 
equilibrium”, and then after the level are less motivated to initiate attacks because of the 
fear of multimarket retaliations/the benefits of mutual forbearance (Karnani & Wernerfelt, 
1985). Haveman and Nonnemaker (2000) and Fuentelsaz and Gomez (2006) also found 
an inverted-U shaped relationship between MMC and firm market entries. 
Contingencies of the mutual forbearance effect 
Multimarket competition scholars are interested in a variety of moderators for the 
mutual forbearance hypothesis, including characteristics of the market, the firm, and the 
relationship between competing firms. For example, market concentration is one of the 
most widely studied contingencies. Research has shown that the mutual forbearance 
effect is stronger in more concentrated markets (Baum & Korn, 1996; Haveman & 
Nonnemaker, 2000; Jayachandran, Gimeno, & Varadarajan, 1999). The rationale is in 
line with the oligopolistic condition I noted earlier. 
Besides market concentration, characteristics about resources 
similarity/dissimilarity also attracted attention from multimarket competition scholars. 
For example, Gimeno and Woo (1999) argue that the effect of MMC on rivalry 
deterrence is stronger when MMC takes place in markets with strong resource-sharing 
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opportunities because of the stronger incentive for tacit collusion. Similarly, Young and 
colleagues (2000) argue that resource similarity provides a common basis for mutual 
forbearance, so firms characterized by resource similarity do not need additional 
information provided by multimarket contacts in order to induce collusive behavior. They 
predicted that the effect of MMC on rivalry deterrence is greater when resources of the 
focal firm are more dissimilar with those of its rivals. Fuentelsaz and Gomez’s (2006) 
findings also supported this argument. On the contrary, Jayachandran, Gimeno, and 
Varadarajan (1999) argue in a conceptual paper that firms with similar resources are 
more likely to recognize each other as significant competitors. Those firms are more 
familiar with each other’s strategies and capabilities, and hold credible threats of 
retaliation for each other. Therefore, the effect of MMC on rivalry deterrence is stronger 
when resources of the focal firm are more similar with those of their rivals.  
Firm-market level contingencies have also been well studied. For example, by 
separating the general effect of MMC and particular effect of reciprocal MMC (e.g. 
sphere of influence). Sphere of influence is characterized by market share or dependence 
asymmetries. Gimeno (1999) found that reciprocal MMC has stronger effect than non-
reciprocal MMC on rivalry deterrence, that is, if two firms with MMC have reciprocal 
dominant markets, there are more opportunities for those firms to signal their own 
territory of interests or footholds in rival’s territory of interest, as a way to facilitate 
coordination. Funentelsaz and Gomez (2006) also confirm the moderating effect of 
spheres of influence. In a global setting, Yu and colleagues (2009) found that government 
regulation (such as policies that constraining competition), cultural distance (between a 
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multinational firm’s home country and a given host country), and subsidiary ownership 
significantly attenuate the effect of MMC on rivalry intensity.  
Limitations of multimarket competition theory 
In sum, conventional multimarket competition theory predicts that firms with 
MMC tend to act less aggressively because of the fear of multimarket retaliation, but 
those firms tend to respond aggressively when they are attacked. Empirically, both 
Young and colleagues (2000) and Yu and Cannella (2007) have revealed a positive 
relationship between action response speed and MMC between attacker and responder. 
However, smith and Wilson’s (1995) study show that the “do nothing” strategy is the 
most frequently observed strategy to respond to an attacker with MMC. They laid out 
four types of responding strategy: do nothing, defend (match attack at the responder’s 
market), counterattack (match attack at the attacker’s market), and total war (attack at 
more than one market), reflecting a continuum of rivalry intensity. According to them, 
the do nothing strategy “leads to an implicit market sharing equilibrium, where the two 
firms implicitly agree to share the market demand.” Yet, this raises questions about how 
competitors can communicate with each other by do nothing response in order to reach 
the implicit market share equilibrium. In this dissertation, I consider word response, an 
alternative response strategy compared to action response and do nothing response, and 
argue that it has the potential to contribute to multimarket competition theory. 
2.1.3 Summary 
During past two decades, CD has attracted interest from a significant number of 
scholars. Both action-response and multimarket competition studies have established 
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streams of research by focusing on interfirm rivalry per se—competitive behaviors. 
Meanwhile, CD scholars have tried to link this relatively new area of strategy research 
with other traditional organizational theories and studies. My dissertation is designed to 
further this attempt in order to enhance our understanding about how firms compete by 
focusing on a specific type of competitive behavior-word response. 
One area of strategy research I want to link with CD is strategic leadership 
literature, which is mainly based on the upper echelon theory. I wonder how strategic 
leaders, such as CEOs, are associated with firm competitive behavior, particularly word 
responses. Next, I am going to review research on the upper echelon theory. 
2.2 Upper Echelons (UE) Theory  
2.2.1 The Role of Managers in UE Theory 
The study of top managers and their effects on organizational outcomes is often 
called the UE perspective (Cannella & Hambrick, 2001). Hambrick and Mason (1984) 
first proposed this perspective in their seminal piece. In this view, the organization is a 
reflection of its top managers, characterized by their cognition, values, and perceptions 
(Carpenter, Geletkanycz, & Sanders, 2004; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). In other words, 
top managers can influence organizational strategy and performance because of their 
cognitive bias and preferences. 
There are several key assumptions behind the UE theory. The first assumption is 
bounded rationality. Drawing from the behavioral theory (Cyert & March, 1963), UE 
assumes that managers are rational but only in a limited way. They are bounded by 
information, absorptive capability and cognitive structures, thus the decision making 
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process is influenced by their personal values and cognitive biases. The second 
assumption is the heterogeneity of managers. Managers are different, considering their 
psychological, cognitive, and demographic factors, thus, their responses to the same 
situation are different.  The third assumption is based on the strategic choice literature, 
that is, top managers lead their organizations by making strategic choices (Cannella & 
Holcomb, 2005). 
The theoretical basis of the UE theory is that managers do matter. Here, I list 
three major reasons why managers are important to organizational studies. First, 
organizational outcomes are not just environmentally determined. Child (1972) made a 
significant contribution in emphasizing the role of managers in decision making. He 
argued that top mangers had the discretion to make choices that can influence 
organizational performance. Thus, strategy research, without considering the role of top 
managers, is incomplete. Second, organization cannot “see” stimuli in the competitive 
environment, “interpret” it, and then “make choices” about it. It is the top manager 
(strategic leader) that deals with competitive events (Finkelstein et al., 2009). Top 
managers have abilities to “anticipate, envision, maintain flexibility, think strategically, 
and work with others to initiate changes that will create a viable future for the 
organization” and this ability is called strategic leadership (Ireland & Hitt, 1999). Third, 
the role of managers is important to competitive advantage. According to the resource-
based view, top managers are key contributors to rents generation, because of valuable 
managerial skills and abilities (Castanias & Helfat, 1991). Barney (1991) argues that 
‘managers are important in this model (the resource-based view), for it is managers that 
  
34 
are able to understand and describe the economic performance potential of a firm’s 
endowments. Without such managerial analyses sustained competitive advantage is not 
likely’. Makadok (2001) has also mentioned that managers are important to competitive 
advantage because they need to identify and manage resources better than competitors.  
2.2.2 UE Theory vs. Agency Theory 
Agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and upper echelons theory (Hambrick 
& Mason, 1984) are dominating theories in studies of top mangers in strategic 
management (Cannella & Monroe, 1997). While agency theory is rooted in economics 
(Coase, 1937), upper echelons theory is rooted in sociology and psychology (Child, 
1972). Each theory has inspired separate lines of literature on how corporate elites (top 
executives and directors) influence strategy (Jensen & Zajac, 2004). Although both 
theories emphasize the role of managers, the approaches are quite different. In agency 
theory, top managers are taken as agents of shareholders, in such a way decision making 
and risk bearing are separated and specialized (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). They are treated as more a liability than a value creator. Managers are self-serving 
economic actors who need monitoring or incentives to keep them from opportunistic 
behavior. In UE theory, top managers are not overtly self-serving. Top managers are 
heterogeneous in psychological characteristics (e.g., knowledge, personality, and 
experience), and they are responsible on filtering and interpreting external environments, 
and then make strategic choices (Finkelstein et al., 2009). Therefore, their characteristics 
and capabilities are critical to the firm’s action and performance. The two perspectives 
for top managers are complementary to some extent: agency theory is a position/role-
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based argument and upper-echelons theory is demography-based argument (Jensen & 
Zajac, 2004).  
2.2.3 Managerial Discretion  
As Finkelstein, Hambrick, and Cannella (2009) pointed, the current UE research 
needs more studies on “when and how” managers matter, and not so much on “whether” 
managers matter. Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) identified an important concept to 
study this boundary condition—managerial discretion, which is defined as the latitude of 
managerial action. They argue that how much managers matter is determined by three 
types of factors: environmental, organizational, and personal characteristics. I will 
discuss those sources of discretion in the following section but not limited to the 
Hambrick and Finkelstein’s works.  
The first source is individual conditions. Managers must be aware of how much 
discretion they have in order to exercise their influence, thus managerial attributes (e.g., 
experience, scanning and insight) are important determinants of discretion. In addition, 
managers who know how to sell their actions have more discretion because they can 
attribute good performance to their actions or choices and earn more discretion 
(Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). Moreover, Finkelstein and Peteraf (2007) argue that 
managers can choose to select activities that may have more influence on the 
organization (the authors consider this as the fourth source of discretion—activity). 
Empirically, there are only few studies that tested the individual condition (Finkelstein et 
al., 2009). The second source is organizational conditions, including inertial forces (such 
as organizational age, size and culture), resource accessibility and political conditions. 
  
36 
For example, mangers have less discretion in firms where a major non-manager owner 
exists (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1995). The third source is environmental conditions. 
Market characteristics such as product diversity and capital intensity can affect 
managerial discretion (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). Also, people tend to rely on 
decision maker’s abilities to process information when there is turbulence/changes/crisis 
in the external environment (Galbraith, 1973; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993; Mintzberg, 
1973). 
2.2.4 Integration of UE and CD 
Strategic leadership, a central force to strategy and competition, is an important 
antecedent of competitive moves. There are several studies that have examined the 
relationship between top manager characteristics and competitive responses (Chen et al., 
2010; Ferrier, 2001; Hambrick et al., 1996; Lin & Shih, 2008; Marcel et al., 2011; Smith 
et al., 1992). For example, Smith et al (1991) argued that more experienced top managers 
tend to avoid risky actions and build their own cognitive models, while less experience 
top managers are more willing to take risky actions and learn new behaviors. They found 
that less experienced managers are more likely to respond and quicker to respond with 
action responses than more experienced managers.  
TMT heterogeneity is one of the most studied managerial predictors for 
competition. The effects of TMT heterogeneity are mainly reflected in two arguments. 
On the one side, TMT heterogeneity represents broader scope of attention and mental 
models, thus the top management members can bring in more cognitive resources for 
decision making. On the other side, different mental models may hinder the information 
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exchange among top management team members and thus reduce the efficiency of 
decision making. For example, in the airline industry, Hambrick, Cho, and Chen (1996) 
found that the more heterogeneous the team, the more likely of it to respond but slower at 
response. Ferrier (2001) found a positive relationship between TMT heterogeneity and 
attack complexity.  
Chen et al (2010) furthered this line of studies and examined the interaction effect 
of TMT integration and hypercompetitive environment on action aggressiveness and firm 
performance. They found that the more cohesive the TMT, the quicker and more decisive 
responses could be made. Marcel, Barr, and Duhaime (2011) make an important 
contribution to link managerial cognition and competitive dynamics research. From a 
longitudinal study of the airline industry, they suggest that manager’s cognitive 
frameworks of “strategic importance” are positively associated with the likelihood and 
speed of action responses. Moreover, the effect of managerial cognition on action is 
negatively moderated by TMT heterogeneity and positively moderated by TMT industry 
tenure. 
2.2.5 Summary 
In sum, although Hambrick and Mason’s UE theory has a “formidable impact and 
far-reaching scope” in strategy research (Carpenter et al., 2004), there is still much we 
don’t know about strategic leaders and their effects. For example, there are only few 
studies about CEO characteristic in CD. As Hambrick noted, “we must do much more 
research to get inside the black box that stands between executive characteristics and 
strategic outcomes.” (Cannella & Hambrick, 2001, p39). Individual factors such as need 
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for power and tolerance for ambiguity can help explain why CEOs make such decisions. 
In this dissertation, I consider the lens of managerial language can help us understand 
how CEO observable characteristics are linked to firm-level strategic outcomes. In 
addition, Hambrick noted another big opportunity in UE is to integrate UE and agency 
theory. I think including both CEO tenure and CEO duality into my model is a move in 
that direction. 
Besides integrating UE and CD to understand how CEOs influence competitive 
behavior, I am also interested in the communication mechanism among competitors. Two 
streams of signaling research in management can help explain the role of language in 
competition. In the next section, I will review signaling research.  
2.3 Signaling Research 
2.3.1 Two Streams of Signaling Research in Management 
Signals have been defined broadly from different disciplines (Heil & Robertson, 
1991). In general, there are two streams of signaling studies in the management field. 
One stream of research has built on Spence’s (1973) signaling theory and applies it 
mainly to solve the information asymmetry problem between a firm and its stakeholders 
(see Connelly et al., 2010 for a review). The signal mentioned in this line of literature is 
more about deliberate communication of positive information in an effort to deliver a 
positive underlying attribute of the organization. For example, firm insiders know better 
about their firm quality than firm outsider (i.e., investors and customers), therefore, firms 
of high quality have more incentives to signal that quality than firm with low quality in 
order to differentiate themselves and achieve benefits (Kirmani & Rao, 2000). Signals 
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from this school are costly and hard to imitate. Correspondingly, for the traditional 
signaling theorist, language is not a signal because they are costless. 
Another stream of signaling studies is about competitive signaling theory. It 
originates from Michael Porter (1980), who defined a market signal as “any action by a 
competitor that provides a direct or indirect indication of its intentions, motives, goals, or 
internal situation” (p.75). This definition includes both language and action as 
competitive signals. Compared to signaling theory, which is mainly focused on positive 
information and information asymmetry between a focal firm and stakeholders, 
competitive signaling theory is focused on competitive information and the influence on 
competitors. More importantly, a distinct difference between those two theories is the 
role of language: according to traditional signaling theory, language is not a signal 
because it is cheap, but according to Porter’s view of competitive signal, language is a 
competitive signal because it carries important competitive information. 
Next I will review those two theories and relevant literature. 
2.3.2 Signaling Theory 
Michael Spence’s (1973) seminal paper proposed a job market signaling model, 
where education credentials can be a signal of a job applicant’s capability for employers. 
The assumption for a signaling model is that when information asymmetry a credible 
signal can narrow the information gap. If the employer receives and accepts the signals, 
equilibrium is generated with other decision-making factors such as the employer’s belief 
about hiring. Economists argue that the market is expected to be more efficient after 
signaling. 
  
40 
Management scholars have applied signaling theory widely in organizational 
research. As Spence (2002) noted, a fundamental concern of signaling theory is to reduce 
information asymmetry between two parties. It is assumed that the party with more 
information wants to communicate with the party with less information. Thus, the central 
theme of signaling studies in management is about the signaling effect: managers 
(insiders of the organization) communicate unobservable organizational attributes with 
outside stakeholders (e.g. investors and consumers) in order to gain legitimacy or positive 
reputations (Certo, 2003; Deephouse, 2000; Zhang & Wiersema, 2009). For example, 
entrepreneurship studies have shown that start-up or IPO firms send out signals to 
potential investors in order show the “true value” of the firm, and this results in improved 
access to capital or stock price performance (Certo, 2003; Lester, Certo, Dalton, Dalton, 
& Cannella, 2006; Zimmerman, 2008). Signals are observable organizational 
characteristics that are costly and hard to copy, such as ownership structure, TMT 
heterogeneity, and board prestige that demonstrate that the firms are economically 
rational investments and are likely to perform well in the future. Signal receivers in 
management studies are mainly existing shareholders and future investors. 
An important factor that may influence the signaling effect is the signaler’s 
credibility (also called signal honesty)—the extent to which the signaler actually has the 
signaled underlying attribute (Connelly et al., 2010). Inaccurate signals (also called signal 
misfit) will influence the receiver’s perception of the signaler and the effectiveness of the 
future signals sent from the signaler. In the management field, signaling theory and 
reputation research are closely related. As Fombrun and Shanley (1990: 234) noted, 
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“reputations (are) the outcomes of a competitive process in which firms signal their key 
characteristics to constituents to maximize their social status”. In addition, while firms 
form reputation through evaluation signals (Weigelt & Camerer, 1988), reputation is also 
a kind of signal from firms (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990). A positive reputation signals 
stakeholders about the attractiveness and reliabilities of the firm (Deephouse, 2000; 
Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Weigelt & Camerer, 1988). 
Language in signaling theory 
Compare to signals, an indirect and costly communication, language in signaling 
theory is another kind of communication—direct and costless (Krishna & Morgan, 2001). 
Based on Spence’s hiring process example, cheap talk theorists argue that the employer 
can just ask the job applicant about their capabilities and then make a choice either based 
on the information or not, depending whether they believe the response or not (Crawford 
& Sobel, 1982; Farrell & Rabin, 1996). The information-asymmetry problem can be 
solved by cheap talk without involving costly signal (i.e., education). 
Crawford and Sobel (1982) first proposed the cheap talk model, “in which a 
better-informed Sender (S) sends a possibly noisy signal to a Receiver (R), who then 
takes an action that determines the welfare of both.” They argue how much information 
to reveal is determined by the preference similarity between S and R. If their preferences 
are aligned, sharing information can bring both parties good pay-offs, then there is no 
incentive for S to lie. This simple model just considers one round of cheap talk 
(communication), so if the preferences of S and R are not aligned, there is no cost for 
lying. Because lies of high quality can get a better pay-offs, there is no incentive to tell 
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the truth. In that case, there is no valuable information from the sender and the receivers 
always ignore the sender’s messages. Therefore, cheap talk theory leads to two 
equilibriums: informative equilibrium and babble equilibrium (equilibrium without useful 
information). The main contribution of this work is that it indicates direct communication 
can also play a role for agents with similar interests or goals, although talk is cheap. 
Empirically, the role of language has not been totally ignored by scholars who 
apply Spence’s signaling theory. For example, some accounting scholars have treated 
voluntary disclosures as signals. The authors claim that the signaling cost of disclosure 
could be the penalty cost for inaccurate disclosure (Hughes, 1986) or the loss of releasing 
private information to competitors (Bhattacharya & Ritter, 1983; Darrough & Stoughton, 
1990). For instance, Hughes (1986) showed that by aligning voluntary disclosure with 
other credible behaviors (e.g. verification from an investment banker or a contingent 
contract with penalty items), “cheap talk” could be an alternative way to reduce 
information asymmetry between the focal firm and outside stakeholders. 
2.3.3 Competitive Signaling Theory  
From Porter’s (1980) perspective, competitive signals are defined as any moves 
that carry competitor’s information, including both words and actions.  Marketing 
scholars often apply Porter’s approach to signaling theory and mainly focus on the 
competitive implications of signals (Heil & Robertson, 1991; Moore, 1990). Competitive 
signaling theory argues that signals are important in oligopolistic settings because 
competitors’ information contributes to the baseline assumption of a focal firm’s decision 
making. Managers are motivated to send out competitive signals in order to improve a 
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firm’s market position (Porter, 1980).  
Competitive signals can be in different forms in terms of signal content, including 
prior announcements of moves, announcements of results or actions after the fact, public 
discussions of the industry by competitors, and competitor’s discussions and explanations 
of their own moves (Porter, 1980). Those competitive signals can have different functions, 
such as preempting, threatening, tests of competitor sentiments, or communicating 
pleasure/displeasure with competitors.  
Similar to the notion of signaler’s credibility in signaling theory, Porter also 
mentioned that competitive signals could be true commitments or bluffs, which may 
trigger competitors to expend resources on an undesired position or defend against a 
nonexistent threat. Therefore, reading/decoding competitive signals is a capability 
competitors need to master based on ongoing comparison between known attributes of 
the sender and the sender’s competitive behaviors. Although collecting and interpreting 
competitive signals may require significant attention from managers, managers cannot 
ignore competitive signals because ignoring signal information is the same as ignoring 
competitors altogether.  
Language in competitive signaling theory 
Verbal statements that reveal competitor’s intentions and attitude could be an 
alternative way of communication between competitors other than competitive actions 
and such words can help explain competitor’s behavior (Heil & Robertson, 1991; Moore, 
1990). For example, “an announcement can be a way to communicate a firm’s 
commitment to carrying out a threat for the purpose of causing a competitor to either 
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back down from or tone down a move or to not initiate it in the first place” (Porter, 1980, 
p79). Those threatening signals may or may not be carried out because the extent of 
commitment carried with the message varies. The signal receiver’s perceived strength of 
the sender's commitment and signal sender’s reputations are key factors for a competitive 
signal to achieve its rivalry deterring effect (Heil & Robertson, 1991).  
Eliashberg and Robertson (1988) have taken new product preannouncing behavior 
as a competitive signal, “a formal, deliberate communications before a firm actually 
undertakes a particular market action”. They found that market dominance, company size, 
and the competitiveness of the environment are negatively associated with preannouncing 
behaviors, while customer switching-costs are positively associated with preannouncing 
behaviors. The preannouncing behavior can help firms gain some benefits as the 
pioneering firm in the industry, such as early positioning of products in most profitable 
segments, developing favorable opinions from stakeholders, and creating entry barriers 
for potential competitors. 
Heil and Robertson’s (1991) study further this line of research by referring 
competitive signals to  “announcements or previews of potential actions intended to 
convey information or to gain information from competitors.” The assumption of 
competitive signaling theory is that responding firms use competitive signals to interpret 
the motivation of attack and then make response decisions. For example, airline firms use 
price reduction in an attacker’s hub area to signal: “I am not happy about your move.” 
The reason why firms engage in such competitive signaling behavior is that the benefits 
of the competitive signal exceed the potential costs. Two major benefits of competitive 
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signals are preemption (to have the first mover advantage) and development of 
competitive norms of conduct (to coordinate with other competitors in the industry). The 
former benefit largely depends on competitive signal sender’s capability to build entry 
barriers and commitment to the signal, while the latter benefit largely depends on the 
competitive signal sender’s market leadership and its ability to enforce sanctions. 
Moreover, in a multi-period pricing simulation experiment, Moore (1992) found 
that competitive messages are more likely to trigger competitive responses in the earlier 
stage of the simulation, while cooperative messages have more significant effect on 
cooperative behaviors in the later stage of the simulation. Robertson, Eliashberg, and 
Rymon (1995) found that competitive signal receivers are more likely to respond to 
hostile signals or signals with higher levels of commitment, and that they will respond 
more aggressively towards more credible signals. 
2.3.4 Summary 
Signaling theory has gained momentum in the management field, including 
strategic management and entrepreneurship. Competitive signaling theory has also gained 
increasing attention from marketing scholars. However, the two closely related theories 
treat the role of language in competition quite differently. On the one hand, according to 
signaling theory, language between competitors, who have inherently conflicting interests, 
is basically not credible communication and cannot reduce information asymmetry 
between the two parties. On the other hand, according to competitive signaling theory, 
language has a significant role in competition as a way to improve or defend market 
position. In addition, both theories have emphasized the importance of the signaler’s 
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reputation. The effect of language in reducing information asymmetry or to improve 
market position is influenced by firm reputation.  
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CHAPTER 3 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
In this chapter, I propose nine hypotheses to reveal the underlying mechanisms 
behind word responses based on the revised action-response perspective as shown in 
Figure 2 (Revised action-response perspective). The nine hypotheses are aimed to answer 
two key questions: when firms (managers) are motivated to respond verbally and what 
kind of firms (managers) are more likely to use word response. Figure 1 (Theoretical 
model of word response) depicts the theoretical framework for this dissertation. 
3.1 Under What Situations are Responders Motivated to Use Word Responses 
Based on Smith et al’s (1992) perspective of action and response, I explore four 
conditions of word responses based on characteristics of the action, the market, and the 
actor: action type (strategic vs. tactical), market dependence of responder, multimarket 
contact of the responder in the market, and competitive aggressiveness of the actor. 
3.1.1 Action Type 
An important distinction of competitive actions is whether they are strategic or 
tactical moves (Dutton & Jackson, 1987; Porter, 1980, 1985). Tactical actions include 
price changes, advertising campaigns, and incremental changes to products or services, 
while strategic actions include important new products or services, major facilities 
expansions, mergers and acquisitions, and strategic alliances. Compared to tactical 
actions, strategic actions involve more significant commitments of resources, carry 
information that is more difficult to interpret, and are more difficult to implement and 
reverse (Chen & Miller, 1994; Chen et al., 1992; Hambrick et al., 1996; Hsieh, Tsai, & 
Chen, 2014). 
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Competitive dynamics (CD) scholars argue that responders are less likely to 
respond to strategic actions because managers need more time to figure out what is going 
on (to remove uncertainty) and more implementation efforts to respond. In contrast, 
targets are more likely to respond to tactical actions because managers are more familiar 
with routine-based moves and it is easier to implement tactical moves in response. 
Empirically, previous studies found that targets are less likely to respond to strategic 
actions with action responses, and targets are slower to respond to strategic actions with 
action responses, compared to tactical actions (Chen et al., 1992; Smith & Grimm, 1991). 
However, from the Austrian school of economics, strategic actions (e.g. new 
product introductions and strategic alliances) may represent the possibility of first-mover 
advantage. The slower the response, the higher possibility the responder to be left behind 
and experience eroded market share caused by the early movers. As Miller and Chen 
(1994) noted, strategic actions are often motivated by expanding markets (compared to 
shrinking markets) and provide some basis for optimism. From this sense, strategic 
actions could motivate managers to respond quickly in order to gain early-mover 
advantages or sustain current advantage. On the other side, managers also need to 
consider the risks associated with responding to strategic actions, such as the uncertain 
effects of strategic actions on the market and the possibility that the interests/preferences 
of powerful stakeholders will be harmed. In general, when attacked by a strategic action, 
responders face threats of possible market share erosion and missed market opportunity 
(if they decide not to respond) or possible action failure (if they decide to respond with an 
action).  
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As a matter of fact, responders are not limited to the options of do nothing or an 
action response but they also have the option of word response. As I defined them earlier, 
word responses are announcements or previews of potential market actions. They are 
competitive signals that carry some commitment and uncertainty. As Porter (1980: 101) 
noted, “If the firm can convince its rivals that it is committed to a strategic move it is 
making or plans to make, it increases the chances that rivals will resign themselves to the 
new position and not expend the resources to retaliate or try to cause the firm to back 
down. Thus commitment can deter retaliation.” Take a new market entry for example, the 
action initiator may back down or tone down the move if the firm encounters a word 
response from a dominant incumbent firm that indicates a possible price-reduction in the 
market.  
The uncertainty feature means that the intention carried in the word response may 
or may not be carried out depending upon the attacker’s reaction or the responder’s 
strategic commitment. As many scholars point out, strategic actions often involve with 
long-term horizons and require significant and continuing commitment (Connelly et al., 
2010; Hsieh et al., 2014; Miller & Chen, 1996).  In contrast, word responses allow more 
flexibility for managers to respond to strategic actions because word responses require 
limited resource allocation at the first place and managers may decide their continued 
commitment based on the reaction to the word response. By just expressing the intention 
for a strategic response, managers are capable of gaining more information from the 
action initiator or stakeholders. Word responses can be used to test the waters for the 
responder. 
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Therefore, for strategic actions, word responses are better than non-response 
because word responses have at least the possibility of deterring rivalry or gaining more 
information about the strategic move, and word responses have some potential 
improvements over action responses because of their reversibility and implementation 
quickness, thus reducing the risk of failure. Here, I predict that the action type is an 
important antecedent of word responses.  Specifically, strategic actions are more likely to 
lead to word responses, as formally stated below. 
Hypothesis 1: Strategic actions, relative to tactical actions, are more likely to provoke 
word responses.  
3.1.2 Market Dependence of Responder 
A responder’s market dependence captures the extent to which the responding 
firm relies on the market(s) affected by an action (Chen & MacMillan, 1992). Market 
dependence was found to be an important determinant of action responses in the CD 
literature (Chen & Miller, 1994; Chen et al., 1992; Livengood & Reger, 2010; MacMillan 
et al., 1985).  Evidence suggests that the more dependent the attacked firm is on the 
market under attack, the more likely the attacked rival will respond and match the initial 
action.  The theoretical explanations arise from different perspectives. By adopting a 
game theory approach, Chen and MacMillan (1992) argued that defenders are balancing 
the payoff for not defending against the payoff for doing so. The defenders’ response 
decisions are very sensitive to the revenues and profits for the attacked market relative to 
the defenders’ total markets. The more an attacker’s move affects the attacked firm’s key 
markets, the more losses the defender suffers, and the more likelihood of action response. 
In contrast, Livengood and Reger (2010) used organizational identity theory to argue that 
some market areas are considered more central and enduring than others and firms have 
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more psychological dependence on those market areas (such areas are called identity 
domain). Thus, when attacked in their identity domains, firms are more motivated to 
respond with action responses because of psychological and emotional ties. 
While firms are motivated to respond to signal the attacker to back off when 
important markets are attacked, they may not need to respond with action response at the 
first place. From a game theory approach, an action response in a highly dependent 
market setting is often costly and risky. For example, the payoff to a competitive war that 
engulfs key markets may not compensate the cost. Although an action response may gain 
some market share back from the attacker, it may also escalate the competition between 
the attacker and the responder. If the cost of an action response is expected to exceed the 
benefits, responders may turn to other alternatives such as word responses. Because the 
strategic intention itself does not harm the rival in a direct way, word responses are less 
likely to stimulate a competitive war between two rivals.  
From a social-cognitive perspective (e.g. identity-domain theory), when an attack 
occurs in a highly dependent market for the responder, managers are motivated to 
respond quickly to demonstrate their willingness to defend their important market 
(Livengood & Reger, 2010). Compared to an action response, a word response is quicker 
to launch and may attract more attention from competitors and stakeholders because of 
the salience of the public intention carried in its statements. Managers may respond with 
an action response later to show more toughness depending on the responder’s capacity 
to implement the intended action and the attacker’s reaction.  
In sum, both game theory and the identity-domain perspective help explain why 
word response can be a good strategic choice for the responder, compared to non-
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response and an action response. It is possible that word response may deter rivalry at the 
first place, as a substitute of action response2. Take, for example, the case of McDonald’s 
and Pizza Hut. After McDonald’s introduced McPizza in selected restaurants to test the 
market in 1989, Pizza Hut immediately threatened “every place you see a McDonald’s 
pizza, you’re going to see a war.” (Shapiro, 1989).  In fact, due to Pizza Hut’s aggressive 
word response, McDonald’s subsequently halted the introduction. Following the logic 
above, I predict the market dependence of the responder as another important antecedent 
of word responses. 
Hypothesis 2: The responder’s dependence on the market under attack will be 
positively associated with the use of word responses. 
3.1.3 Multimarket Contact 
Multimarket contact (MMC) describes a situation wherein two or more firms 
compete with each other in more than one product or geographic market (Yu & Cannella, 
2013). With the existence of MMC between two firms, if one firm initiates an attack, the 
other firm can respond not only in the market being challenged, but also in other markets 
where both firms are present (Karnani & Wernerfelt, 1985). As a result, Edwards (1955) 
introduced the notion of “mutual forbearance” and argued that firms competing against 
each other in multiple markets will hesitate to compete aggressively because the cost of 
warfare across multiple markets is too high. Schelling (1960) noted later that what deters 
multimarket rivalry is not the aggressive retaliation per se after an attack but rather the 
expectation that such retaliation will occur. MMC helps competitors become familiar 
                                                 
2 Word response may deter rivalry in some situations, as a substitute of action response. In some situations, 
word response may need a following action response to deter rivalry, as a complement of action response. 
Exploration of those situations is beyond the scope of this study.  
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with each other, realize the common benefits of mutual forbearance, and implicitly 
coordinate their expectations and behavior (Jayachandran et al., 1999).  
Sometimes, however, competitors do not follow the norm of forbearance even in 
the presence of MMC. Several CD scholars have provided theoretical explanations about 
how a firm might respond when a competitor with MMC challenges it (Chen, 1996; 
Young et al., 2000; Yu & Cannella, 2007). They argue that under this situation, the attack 
is often perceived as a betrayal to the expectation of mutual forbearance and the 
responder has more assets at risk and greater incentive to enforce the norm of forbearance 
by sharp retaliation. The quicker the response, the stronger signal of toughness sent out to 
the attacker. Based on this argument, both Young and colleagues’ (2000) and Yu and 
Cannella (2007) found a positive relationship between action response speed and MMC 
between attacker and responder.  
However, on the other side, smith and Wilson’s (1995) study showed that no 
action response is the most frequently observed response to an attacker with MMC, 
compared to other action response strategies such as defend, counterattack, and total war. 
They argued that the “do nothing” strategy (i.e., no action response) “leads to an implicit 
market-sharing equilibrium, where the two firms implicitly agree to share the market 
demand.” Yet, this raises questions about how competitors can communicate with each 
other by no action response in order to reach the implicit market share equilibrium.  
I suggest that the word response may be an omitted option of the defending 
strategy under MMC. Compared to action responses, word responses are quicker and they 
can also carry some commitment to retaliation. Word responses can perform the function 
of communicating expectations among competitors, the underlying mechanism of mutual 
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forbearance noted by Schelling (1960). Further, the quickness and public exposure of a 
word response can express a strong willingness to defend a market position.  
Additionally, a competitive war across multiple markets is very costly. Different 
from an action response, a word response only warns the initiating rival without causing 
direct harm and escalating the aggression. A pre-announcement is therefore less risky and 
can also indirectly inform the rival that the attack “crosses the line”.  In this way, the 
responder can put forth a response, but one that reduces the likelihood that the two firms 
will be drawn into a costly multimarket war.   
Therefore, here, I predict multimarket contact as an important antecedent of the 
likelihood of word responses. It is highly possible that smith and Wilson (1995) included 
the word response strategy into the “do nothing” category, just like many other CD 
studies. 
Hypothesis 3: The degree of multimarket contact of the responder in the market will be 
positively associated with the use of word responses. 
3.1.4 Competitive Aggressiveness 
Competitive aggressiveness refers to the extent to which a firm defends its market 
position with actions. The concept of competitive aggressiveness is rooted in 
Schumpeter’s description about competitiveness—the capacity to carry out a range of 
competitive actions in order to maintain an advantage (Ferrier et al., 1999).  Two 
important dimensions of competitive aggressiveness are action volume and action 
complexity (Yu et al., 2009). Action volume captures the total number of competitive 
actions carried out in a given time period, while action complexity captures the range of 
action types carried out in a given time period. Research has shown that a firm that is 
aggressive in carrying out more and a wider range of competitive actions than rivals will 
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exploit more opportunities and close off more potential for rivals to retaliate (D'Aveni, 
1994; Ferrier, 2001). Because there are fewer action responses from rivals, the aggressive 
firm can maintain its lead ahead of others. Empirically, CD scholars have found that 
competitive aggressiveness is positively related to firm performance (Ferrier, 2001; 
Ferrier et al., 1999; Young et al., 1996). 
However, there are few studies that directly test the relationship between 
competitive aggressiveness and action responses, although the argument clearly implies a 
negative relationship between them. Moreover, we do not know how competitive 
propensity to take actions will influence the responder’s motivation to use word 
responses. By adopting competitive signaling theory, I argue that word responses can 
deter rivalry by expressing strategic intention and communicating commitment on the 
part of the responder. The reputation for being an “aggressive” competitor indicates both 
a strong willingness and capability for a head-to-head competition (Clark & Montgomery, 
1998). Such an actor will be less likely to halt an attack after receiving a signal from a 
responder. Makadok (2010) concluded that firms with superior capabilities tend to ignore 
mechanism of a rivalry restraint like MMC. Instead of interpreting word responses as an 
attempt to deter rivalry, there is good possibility that an aggressive attacker may interpret 
a word response as an aggressive move (not a defensive move) because of the publicity 
of word response and then initiate more attacks. Put simply, managers are less motivated 
to respond with words to an aggressive actor because responders know word responses 
are unlikely to be effective. 
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Therefore, I predict the competitive aggressiveness of the actor is an important 
antecedent of the likelihood of word response. Managers are less motivated to use word 
responses to deter rivalry from aggressive competitors. 
Hypothesis 4: The competitive aggressiveness of the actor will be negatively associated 
with the use of word responses. 
3.2 What Kinds of Responders are More Likely to Use Word Responses? 
Besides characteristics of the action, the market, and the actor, I explore three 
characteristics of the responder that can help explain the use of word responses: firm 
reputation for stakeholders, CEO tenure, and CEO duality. Responders with good 
reputations, long CEO tenures, and CEO duality are more likely to adopt word responses. 
I also suggest the moderating effects of CEO tenure and CEO duality on relationship 
between situational characteristics (e.g., characteristics of the action, the market, and the 
actor) and word responses. 
3.2.1 Firm Reputation Among Stakeholders 
Different from what I mentioned about the reputation as an aggressive competitor 
(i.e., competitive reputation), firm reputation in this section refers to “stakeholders’ 
perceptions about an organization’s ability to create value relative to competitors” 
(Rindova et al., 2005). Rooted in signaling theory, firm reputation is formed on the basis 
of past behaviors and it can represent a public signal of the firm’s “true” attributes such 
as product quality, strategic posture, and institutional conformity (Fombrun & Shanley, 
1990). Stakeholders rely on firm reputations to make investment and purchase decisions, 
so a favorable reputation can contribute to stakeholder support. Firm reputation has been 
well recognized as an important source of competitive advantage (Basdeo et al., 2006; 
Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Hall, 1992), and many studies have found a positive 
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relationship between firm reputation and firm performance (Deephouse, 2000; Fombrun 
& Shanley, 1990; Roberts & Dowling, 2002). 
However, there are only a few studies that try to associate firm reputation among 
stakeholders with competitive actions. One exception is Basdeo and colleagues’s (2006) 
study on the formulation of firm reputation. Drawing on signaling theory, they argue that 
firm actions and competitors’ actions are determinants of firm reputation. The more 
actions a focal firm takes, the more information is available for stakeholders to reduce 
perceived uncertainty, thus the more positive the impression formed by stakeholders. 
Similarly, the authors argue that more complex actions provide more information and can 
signal strategic flexibility, top management team experience, or the capacity to learn and 
respond to diverse opportunities. Among rivals, the more actions taken by a rival, the 
more the attacked firm’s attention is diverted from stakeholders and the more potential 
cost associated with a focal firm’s action (e.g., retaliation cost), thus the less likely that 
the firm will have a positive impression formed by the stakeholder.  
To predict the effect of firm reputation on competitive responses, I suggest that 
firms with favorable reputations are more likely to leverage the good impressions of 
stakeholders because the responders know their words are relatively more powerful and 
credible to the actor. Competitors will perceive higher commitment carried with the word 
response if the responder has a high firm reputation because the public 
visibility/prominence of those firms is higher. In other words, there is more potential for a 
word response to successfully substitute for an action response if firm reputation is high.  
Besides communicating commitment with competitors, word responses can help 
build firm reputation, which further motivates responders to use word responses. Rindova 
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and colleagues (2005) have suggested two dimensions of firm reputation—stakeholder’s 
perceptions about the firm’s quality and organizational prominence. On the one hand, 
word responses provide more information about the firm’s next move than non-response, 
thus enhance reputation by reducing uncertainty for the stakeholder. On the other hand, 
the public nature of a word response can increase the prominence dimension of firm 
reputation. Because mass media tend to cite and quote top executives’ statements about 
future actions, it is very possible that a word response attracts more public attention than 
an action response, as the awareness of action responses may be limited to affected 
competitors. 
Although the strategic intent in a word response may or may not be lead to action 
responses, statements of unfulfilled intentions may not influence stakeholder’s support 
for two reasons. First, the intention statement often comes with an endnote that explicitly 
claims that the firm has no obligation to stick to the forward-looking statement. Public 
observers are aware that there can be multiple reasons for an unrealized intention 
statement, and these are not limited to intentional bluffs. Second, firm reputation 
represents accumulated expectations from stakeholders with inertia attached (Rindova & 
Fombrun, 1999). The inertia means that a firm may be able to continue to gain 
stakeholder support even when its strategy is no longer viable. Therefore, responders do 
not need to bind their word responses tightly to intended action responses.  
Here, I predict that the responder’s reputation among stakeholders is an important 
antecedent of the likelihood of a word response.   
Hypothesis 5: Responder reputation will be positively associated with the use of word 
responses. 
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3.2.2 CEO Tenure 
CEO tenure has been proposed as a key influence on strategic choices (Hambrick, 
1984). Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991) suggested five seasons of a CEO’s tenure in the 
position—response to mandate, experimentation, selection of an enduring theme, 
convergence, and dysfunction.  Each stage represents a distinct pattern of CEO attention 
and behavior. The authors assume that CEO decision-making is reflected by managerial 
schemata and repertoires (i.e., CEO paradigms) and are importantly influenced by a set of 
interrelated forces such as prior organizational problems and political pressures from the 
board of directors. Because the strength of those forces varies across different stages of 
CEO tenure, CEO strategic choices are also characterized by different temporal patterns. 
For example, at the beginning of their tenure, CEOs experience stronger pressure to 
reveal what changes are expected to happen, so the CEO’s actions are largely a reflection 
of the going-in-mandate. After gaining some success and establishing a political foothold, 
CEOs can have more flexibility about their strategic choices. In the later stages, CEOs are 
relatively more committed to their paradigms, make fewer changes, and have more power 
in the organization. This study sets the foundation for many later works on CEO tenure 
because it captures the dynamic implications of CEO tenure (Barker & Mueller, 2002; 
Henderson, Miller, & Hambrick, 2006; Shen, 2003; Simsek, 2007; Wu, Levitas, & Priem, 
2005).  
However, CEO tenure has received limited attention in competitive dynamics 
settings. As an exception, Smith and colleagues’ (1991) study argued that more-
experienced managers tend to avoid risky actions and rely on their existing cognitive 
models, while less-experienced managers are more likely to engage in novel and risky 
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actions, respond faster to competitive attacks, and are less likely to imitate the actions of 
others. Put simply, less experienced managers take more risks and are more aggressive 
than more experienced managers. 
Based on Hambrick and Fukutomi’s (1991) study and Smith et al’s (1991) study, I 
predict that CEO tenure is also an important antecedent of word responses. On the one 
hand, upper-echelons scholars argue that more experienced CEOs are better at leveraging 
existing knowledge and resources to exploit opportunities (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991; 
Miller, 1991). Compared to action responses, word responses are potentially more 
effective at exploiting firm-level intangible assets such as reputation as a credible 
defender and firm reputation among stakeholders. Less-experienced CEOs may not have 
accumulated enough reputational strength to leverage (due to CEO turnover) and are less 
able to exploit the opportunity to use words instead of actions. Long-tenured CEOs learn 
as their tenures progress, and are thereby more familiar with competitive interactions 
with competitors, including verbal communications. Thus, long-tenured CEOs are more 
likely to take advantage of word responses to test the waters or to threaten rivals before 
they decide to respond with actual actions.  
On the other hand long-tenured CEOs tend to be more committed to their 
paradigms and often talk in public to show their wisdom (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1990). 
As Smith and colleagues (1991) argued, long-tenured CEOs are more risk averse than 
short-tenured CEOs. Compared to action responses, word responses are less aggressive 
and do not harm the attacker. Several studies found that long-tenured CEOs are more 
likely to pursue Miles and Snow’s (1978) “defender” strategy, as opposed to the 
“prospector” strategy. For example, Barker and Mueller’s (2002) study showed that CEO 
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tenure was negatively associated with R&D spending. The longer CEOs stay in their 
positions, the more strategic emphasis is placed on stability (Finkelstein et al., 2009) and 
the less aggressive they become. When attacked, the responder CEO may face a dilemma 
of maintaining stability with key stakeholders and competitors and his/her unwillingness 
to make strategic change. A word response can send out a competitive signal of warning 
to competitors in order to deter rivalry, and at the same time send out a signal to key 
stakeholders indicating that the CEO is capable of handling challenges. The uncertainty 
of a word response allows the CEO flexibility with respect to enacting the intended 
strategic change. 
Here, I hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 6: Responder CEO tenure will be positively associated with the use of word 
responses.  
3.2.3 Moderating Effects of CEO Tenure  
Besides the main effect of CEO tenure on word response, I predict that CEO 
tenure can influence the relationship between action type/MMC/market dependence and 
the likelihood of a word response.  
Upper-echelons research has suggested that long-tenured CEOs are more reluctant 
to initiate strategic change. Similarly, I argue that the long-tenured CEOs are less 
motivated to respond with action responses because strategic actions are associated with 
more uncertainty and changes than tactical actions. Compared to action responses, word 
responses can help test waters or deter rivalry, while reducing the risk of action failure. 
Therefore, long-tenured CEOs are more likely to use word response, an alternative 
competitive response, when the initiating action is a strategic action rather than a tactical 
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action. Put differently, CEO tenure will moderate the relationship between strategic 
actions and word responses such that the relationship will be strengthened by CEO tenure.   
Research has also shown that long-tenured CEOs are less likely to engage in risk-
taking (Miller & Shamsie, 2001; Smith & Grimm, 1991). When an attack occurs in an 
important market or the attack initiator has a high level of MMC with the responding firm, 
the responder does not want to risk provoking all-out war in an important market or 
multiple markets. Compared to an action response, a word response is less aggressive and 
less risky. Therefore, I suggest that longer tenured CEOs are more likely to use word 
responses when the market dependence of the responder is high or the level of MMC of 
the responder in the market is high.  
Hypothesis 7a: Responder CEO tenure will positively moderate the relationship between 
the action type (strategic action vs. tactical action) and the likelihood of 
word responses. 
Hypothesis 7b: Responder CEO tenure will positively moderate the relationship between 
multimarket contact (of the responder in the market) and the likelihood 
of word responses. 
Hypothesis 7c: Responder CEO tenure will positively moderate the relationship between 
market dependence and the likelihood of word responses. 
3.2.4 CEO Duality 
CEO duality is another well-studied construct in upper-echelons research and has 
been widely discussed in corporate governance practice (Krause et al., 2014). CEO 
duality occurs when a CEO also serves as the board chairman. There is some controversy 
in the literature regarding the effect of CEO duality on firm performance. According to 
agency theory, CEO duality will promote CEO entrenchment by reducing the 
effectiveness of board monitoring, and thus may be negatively related with firm 
performance. In contrast, according to organizational theory, CEO duality represents 
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strong and unambiguous leadership and thus may be positively related with firm 
performance (Daily & Dalton, 1997; Finkelstein & D'Aveni, 1994; Sanders & Carpenter, 
1998). Although there is no clear conclusion about the relationship between CEO duality 
and firm performance, it is generally agreed that CEO duality indicates more CEO power 
(Krause et al., 2014). Scholars also suggest that CEO duality might have an effect on 
risk-avoidance because more powerful CEOs are able to pursue less risky strategies in 
accordance with their own risk preferences.  For example, Ellstrand and colleagues (2002) 
showed that CEOs with dual status tended to favor international initiatives with more 
certain outcomes, presumably in order to protect their executive positions. Diversification 
strategy is also an avenue to help a CEO reduce the exposure to risk. For example, 
Castañer & Kavadis (2013) found that CEO duality is positively associated with a 
financial diversification strategy because diversification can reduce investment risk for 
the CEO.  
However, there are few studies that have tried to integrate CEO duality, as a 
corporate governance characteristic, with competitive dynamics. Considering the power 
associated with CEO duality, CEOs with more power will have more discretion, 
including more discretion to speak in public and reveal their firms’ intentions for the next 
move. Considering the propensity toward risk aversion, I argue that CEOs with dual 
status are more likely to choose word responses over action responses when the firm is 
challenged by an attack because word responses are less risky and more flexible, and dual 
CEOs have stronger standing with their boards and can resist governance pressures for a 
more action-oriented response.  
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Therefore, here, I predict CEO duality is an important antecedent of word 
responses.  
Hypothesis 8: Responders with CEOs who are also board chairs will be more likely to 
use word responses. 
3.2.5 Moderating Effects of CEO Duality 
Besides the main effect of CEO duality on the likelihood of word response, I also 
predict that the CEO duality can moderate the relationships between the action 
type/MMC/market dependence of the responder and the likelihood of word response. 
Similar to CEO tenure, because dual CEOs are more risk averse, they are more 
likely to use word responses when market dependence is high, when MMC is high, or 
when the initiating action is strategic. Moreover, because dual CEOs are more powerful 
than non-dual CEOs, they enjoy higher discretion in making strategic choices. Thus, dual 
CEOs have more opportunity and capability to speak in pubic when it is necessary, 
especially in situations of strategic attack, attack from a multimarket player, or attack in 
highly important market. In other words, the responder’s motivation to use word 
responses under those situations will be stronger if the CEO also carries the title of board 
chair. 
Hypothesis 9a: Responder CEO duality will positively moderate the relationship 
between the action type (strategic action vs. tactical action) and the 
likelihood of word responses. 
Hypothesis 9b: Responder CEO duality will positively moderate the relationship 
between multimarket contact (of the responder in the market) and the 
likelihood of word responses. 
Hypothesis 9c: Responder CEO duality will positively moderate the relationship 
between market dependence and the likelihood of word responses. 
3.3 Summary 
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In this chapter, building on the action-response perspective and competitive 
signaling theory, and incorporating literatures on firm reputation, upper echelons, and 
corporate governance, I investigate how characteristics of the action, the market, the actor, 
and the responder influence the likelihood of a word response. Accordingly, nine 
hypotheses are suggested by using antecedents like action type (strategic action vs. 
tactical action), market dependence of the responder (market attribute), MMC of the 
responder in the market (market attribute), competitive aggressiveness of the actor (actor 
attribute), firm reputation of the responder, responder CEO tenure, and responder CEO 
duality. My arguments are also based on a behavioral approach of strategy, that is, the 
strategic choices are influenced by executive’s cognition, emotion, words, and actions. 
When attacked, executives of the responder are the decision makers who need to consider 
the relative costs and benefits for the firm, the competitive implications, the level of 
stakeholder support, and the CEO’s self-interests. By exploring the underlying 
mechanism behind word responses, this theoretical framework aims to further our 
understanding about the role of language in competitive interactions.  
In the next section, methodology, I will discuss the sample setting, variable 
measurement, data collection, study design, and statistical analysis for the tests of the 
proposed hypotheses regarding word responses.  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
In this chapter, I describe the methodology used to test the hypotheses presented 
in Chapter 3 (as shown in Figure 1). This chapter consists of four sections: 1) sample 
selection describes the sample industry and the sample firms; 2) overall research 
procedure, including data collection and identification of competitive actions and word 
actions; 3) measurement of major variables; and 4) an overview of the statistical analyses.  
4.1 Sample Selection  
4.1.1 Sample Industry 
I choose the consumer electronics (CE) industry as the empirical setting for 
hypothesis testing based on the following considerations. First, there is high degree of 
interdependence among the large players in the CE industry. As I discussed in Chapter 2, 
an essential context for studies on actions-responses and multimarket competition is 
oligopolistic settings. Firms in such setting are more likely to be aware of rivals’ moves, 
influenced by the moves and motivated to respond to the moves. Because of the high 
interdependence, when making decisions about actions and responses, managers need to 
consider how competitors might respond to the actions they are contemplating. Second, 
the CE industry is well known for intense competitive interactions. As Chen (1988) and 
Yu (2003) noted, it is desirable to limit an action-response study to a highly competitive 
environment where many competitive events can be observed and firms need to be 
responsive to each other. Third, there is rich information about competitive moves in the 
CE industry. Information regarding competitive actions/responses and word 
actions/responses are often available in form of public statements, and spread by media 
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such as industry journals, mass media outlets, press releases, and earnings conference 
calls. Thus, it would be possible for researchers to rely solely on published information to 
trace competitive moves and interactions.  Fourth and important for my study, the CE 
industry is considered to be a high-discretion industry (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; 
Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993), in which managers have more opportunities and 
capabilities to release strategic information to the public if they want to. This 
consideration for word-based actions/responses is similar to the second consideration for 
other actions/responses. I limit my study to such a setting, where many word 
actions/responses are issued and made observable to the competitors. 
The CE industry includes eight market sectors: computers and peripherals, mobile 
phones, televisions, home audio and cinema, video players, imaging device, portable 
players, and in-car entertainment. 
4.1.2 Sample Firms 
My sample was selected using the CE Industry data made available by the Global 
Market Information Database (also known as EuroMonitor or GMID). In the global CE 
industry, I identified 20 CE manufacturers according to their sales rankings in each 
market sector. I included, for each sector, manufacturers that are in the top 5 in sales 
AND whose sales volume comprised more than 5% of sales for the market sector under 
consideration.  All firms that met these two criteria for any given sampling year between 
2007 and 20143 were included, yielding a set of 20 firms.  I consider these 20 CE 
manufacturers as representing all major players in the CE industry.  
                                                 
3 Although Nokia was acquired by Microsoft in 2014, I decide to include Nokia in my sampling firms 
because it is a dominant player in the market sector of mobile phone from 2007-2013.  
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Table 5 depicts the market dominance and presence of my sample of 20 major CE 
players. For the market sector of computer and peripherals, the dominant players are 
Apple, Hewlett-Packard, Samsung, Lenovo, Acer and Dell (ranked by market share in 
2013)4. For the market sector of mobile phones, the dominant players are Samsung, 
Nokia, Apple, and LG. For the market sector of television, the dominant players are 
Samsung, LG, Sony, Panasonic, and Sharp. For the market sector of home audio and 
cinema, the dominant players are Sony, Panasonic, Koninklijke Philips, and Samsung. 
For the video player market sector, the dominant players are Sony, Samsung, Koninklijke 
Philips, LG and Panasonic. For the imaging device market sector, the dominant players 
are Canon, Nikon, Sony, Fuji Photo, and Samsung. For the portable device market sector, 
the dominant players are Apple, Sony, Amazon.com, and Samsung. For the in-car 
entertainment market sector, the dominant players are Garmin, Pioneer, JVC Kenwood, 
TomTom, and Sony. In total, those 20 major CE manufacturers take up 63.4% of the 
revenues represented by the CE industry.  
4.2 Overall Research Procedure 
4.2.1 Data Collection 
To identify actions and responses I adopt an approach that is widely employed by 
CD researchers—structured content analysis (Chen, 1988; Ferrier et al., 1999; Smith et 
al., 1992; Young et al., 1996; Yu, 2003). Important competitive events of major CE 
manufacturers include action-based moves and word-based moves over the period 
between January 1, 2007 and December 31, 2014. Data about competitive events are 
                                                 
4 Since I consider manufacturers that are in the top 5 in sales and whose retail volume comprised more than 
5% in “any given sampling year”, there are six dominant players in the computer and peripheral market 
sector. 
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collected from news and press releases that are archived on RavenPack, Factiva and firm 
websites. RavenPack is a news analytical tool that provides information about Dow Jones 
news including DJ Newswire and Wall Street Journal articles. RavenPack identifies the 
publish time of news, related companies, and types of news (e.g. merger and acquisition, 
product price cut), which are mostly important for my dissertation.  
Financial data of the sampling firms is from Compustat and the Global Market 
Information Database. Data about firm reputations for stakeholders is collected from 
Fortune’s ranking of “World’s most admirable companies”. Data about CEO tenure and 
CEO duality is collected from firm annual reports, proxy statements, and firm websites. 
4.2.2 Identification of Action-based and Word-based Competitive Moves 
My dataset of competitive moves is mainly based on RavenPack and 
supplemented by Factiva and firm websites. I conducted the following steps to generate 
the competitive move dataset. (1) The original search of sampling firms within the 
sampling years (2007-2014) in RavenPack yielded 20,068 news articles. (2) I removed 
duplicated news based on RavenPack’s Event Novelty Score (i.e., ENS=100). (3) I coded 
competitive-move related news categories from 214 news categories. Two experts on 
competitive dynamics also coded those categories separately. We compared and 
discussed our results and finalized 81 competitive-move related categories, yielding 
7,221 prospective competitive moves.   
Following previous CD studies, a competitive action is considered as a specific 
and externally observable market-oriented move made by a firm in order to improve or 
defend its competitive position in a given market sector, such as a price cut, a promotion 
campaign, and a market expansion. I identify an action based on the following criteria: (1) 
  
70 
The event is conducted by the focal firm, not by other parties (e.g. media commentary); 
(2) The event is a competitive move, not a financial statement; (3) It either had occurred 
at the time of public release or was expected to occur with certainty (i.e., the report 
mentions specifics like date, location, and content of action).  
As I defined it earlier, a word-based move is a specific and public announcement 
of a focal firm’s potential move in response to a competitor’s word or action attacks. A 
word-based move expresses a responder’s strategic intent to retaliate although in a 
reversible way. I identify a word action based on the following criteria. (1) The event is 
conducted by the focal firm, not by other parties; (2) It is announced by an official source 
of a firm (e.g. press release, spokesperson, or top executive), not by rumor; (3) 
Announcement includes a strategic intent, initiative, or plan (i.e., potential action). It is 
not an action that had already occurred and is not concurrent with the announced intent. 
For example, “Hewlett-Packard confirms it is in talks with EDS for M&A” or “Product 
xxx is available today/tomorrow” are not considered as word actions because they are 
concurrent with the announced actions.  
I list two examples of word actions here. One is from Hewlett-Packard, and the 
other is from Dell. 
HP today announced new research initiatives from HP Labs, the company’s central 
research arm, aimed at developing new technologies and business models that leave 
a lighter carbon footprint. “HP’s long-standing commitment to the environment is 
second to none in the technology industry. Today, HP Labs extends our dedication 
with these important research initiatives that will advance the state of the art in 
sustainable IT,” said Prith Banerjee, senior vice president, research, and director, 
HP Labs. “HP Labs will lead the industry in developing the technology that could 
dramatically reduce energy consumption and the carbon footprint of entire 
industries.” 
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"When we look at the potential for expansion, we do see enormous opportunity ahead. 
[...] As far as the U.S. goes, I think the U.S. will be OK, but not the fastest-growing.” 
“We expect more growth in Asia. This year, we plan to introduce 50 percent more 
notebook platforms than we introduced last year, including exciting new products 
aimed exactly at Chinese customer needs", said Michael Dell (CEO of Dell) at a news 
conference.  
For action responses and word responses, I follow Ferrier, Smith and Grimm 
(1999) and Yu and Cannella (2007) and identify competitive responses based on temporal 
sequence. That is, I consider a subsequent action/word action from a rival that occurs 
after a competitive action of another firm as a competitive response. The response occurs 
in the market in which the initiating action occurred (the attacked market). 
I check the reliability of the coding schemes of competitive moves with two other 
researchers in strategic management. Three of us coded a random subsample of 50 
competitive moves separately, including actions and word actions. I compared our coding 
results and the inter-rater agreement is good (Cohen’s Kappa is 0.85).  
I identified the market of the competitive moves first based on keywords of each 
market. For example, market of computer and peripheral includes keywords like 
computer, PC, laptop, printer, monitor, scanner, and LaserJet; market of mobile phones 
includes keywords like mobile, phone, cellphone, 3G, handsets, iPhone, and Galaxy; 
market of television includes keywords like TV, television, LCD, LED, and Plasma; 
market of home audio includes keywords like speaker; market of video player include 
keywords like DVD and VCD; market of camera includes keywords like camera; market 
of portable player includes keywords like iPad, Kindle, touchpad, tablet, and iPod; 
market of in-car entertainment includes keywords like GPS. I then carefully manually 
checked those categories and recoded them if necessary.  
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After manual and computer-aided coding, prospective moves that are not 
competitive moves or not in the eight markets or are duplicates are dropped from the 
competitive move dataset. The final dataset includes 550 word-based moves and 2393 
action-based moves, 2943 competitive moves in total.  
4.3 MEASUREMENT 
In this section, I discuss the measures of the dependent variable, the proposed 
antecedents of word responses and important control variables. 
4.3.1 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable of this study is the likelihood of word response. I 
measured word response as a dichotomous variable representing the occurrence of the 
event. I coded the occurrence of word response as 1, and other situations (action response 
and non-response) as 0.  
4.3.2 Independent Variables 
Action Type  
Action type is defined and dichotomized as strategic actions or competitive moves 
that are not strategic actions. Following pervious CD studies (Chen et al., 1992; Miller & 
Chen, 1994), strategic actions indicate significant commitment of resources, including 
actions such as major product actions, capacity-related actions, mergers and acquisitions, 
and strategic alliances. Competitive moves that are not strategic actions include pricing 
actions, marketing actions, minor product actions, and word-based moves. Since 
Ravenpack classifies all Dow Jones news into different news types (e.g. product price-cut 
and acquisition), I further classify those news types into my measure of action type. In 
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addition, I consider competitive moves that include keywords like “update, upgrade, 
enhance, extend, expand” to be tactical actions. 
Market Dependence of the Responder 
Market dependence of the responder is defined as the extent to which a responder 
relies on the markets affected by an action (Chen & MacMillan, 1992). In my empirical 
setting, it is the proportion of the firm’s retail volume that derives from the market sector 
of the action in the year the action was taken. For example, if the action occurred in the 
television market sector, the market dependence of the responder is the retail volume of 
the television market sector divided by the responder’s total retail volume across all 
market sectors in that given year. 
Multimarket Contact (MMC) 
There are several ways/levels to measure MMC, such as dyad and firm-in-market 
level of measurement (Gimeno & Jeong, 2001). Because I am interested in a responding 
firm’s competitive decision within a specific market, I used the firm-in-market measure 
of MMC to study the occurrence of word response. Firm-in-market MMC captures the 
extent of overlapped markets (other than the focal market) between a focal firm and other 
market participants in the focal market (Baum & Korn, 1996; Boeker et al., 1997; 
Gimeno & Woo, 1996). To test Hypothesis 3, I measured the MMC of firm i in market m 
as follows: 
𝑀𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑚 =
∑ ∑ (𝐷𝑖𝑚 × 𝐷𝑗𝑚)𝑗≠𝑖𝑚
𝑁𝑀𝑀𝐶
, for all 𝑗 ∑(𝐷𝑖𝑚 × 𝐷𝑗𝑚) > 1,
𝑚
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where 𝑁𝑀𝑀𝐶 is the number of firms j that contact the responding firm i in market m  (firm 
j encounters with firm i in more than one market), 𝐷𝑖𝑚 is an indicator variable that sets to 
1 if firm i is present in market m and 0 otherwise, and 𝐷𝑗𝑚 is set to 1 if firm j is present in 
market m and 0 otherwise.  Thus, the overall measure of MMC of the responder i in 
market m is the average market domain overlap with multimarket competitors j 
encountered at market m. 
In the robustness check, I also tested the dyad level measure of MMC, which 
captures the extent of overlapping markets between the responder and the actor (Baum & 
Korn, 1999). 
Competitive Aggressiveness of the Actor 
Competitive aggressiveness of the actor is defined into two dimensions: action 
volume and action complexity (Yu et al., 2009). I adopt Yu and colleagues’ (2009) 
measure of competitive aggressiveness, which is consistent with prior CD studies (Ferrier, 
2001; Miller & Chen, 1996; Young et al., 1996). Action volume is the total number of 
competitive actions initiated by the actor in a given year, while action complexity is the 
extent to which the actor carries out a broad range of competitive actions, captured by the 
total number of action types. Different action types in this study include: (1) major 
product action, (2) minor product action, (3) merger and acquisition, (4) alliance, (5) 
capacity action, (6) legal issue, and (7) changes in organizational structure. I use factor 
analysis to generate the composite variable competitive aggressiveness of the actor. 
Cronbach’s alpha for the two component measures is 0.84, and they are loaded at 0.78 
onto a single principal component factor. 
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Firm Reputation of the Responder 
Pfarrer, Pollock, and Rindova’s (2010) study about firm reputation and celebrity 
pointed out that the dichotomous approach to firm reputation (i.e., high reputation vs. low 
reputation) is more appropriate than the continuous measure when firm reputation needs 
to be separated from firm celebrity, which is measure by media visibility. This is because 
continuous ranking may create an artificial difference where no real difference exists 
(Rao, 1994). Because media visibility is also an important variable that may influence the 
likelihood of word response, I will include it as a control variable. Therefore, the 
dichotomous measure of firm reputation is more appropriate for my study.  
Consistent with prior studies (Basdeo et al., 2006; Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; 
Pfarrer et al., 2010; Roberts & Dowling, 2002), data on firm reputation is based on the 
rankings in Fortune’s “World’s Most Admired Companies”. I code a responder as having 
a high reputation if it appears among the top 50 firms on the list (1 for high reputation 
and 0 otherwise). Table 6 shows the firm reputations of the 20 major CE manufacturers.  
Responder CEO Tenure 
CEO tenure is measured as the total number of years an individual had held the 
chief executive officer position with a company (Henderson et al., 2006; Wu et al., 2005). 
These data are collected from company filings and official websites.  
Responder CEO Duality 
The CEO duality is coded as 1 when a CEO also serves as the board chairman, 
and 0 otherwise. These data are collected from company filings and official websites. 
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4.3.3 Control Variables 
Firm Level Controls 
For the attacker, I include firm size, organizational slack and firm reputation. For 
the responder, I include firm size, organizational slack, and firm media visibility. Firm 
size is measured by total number of employees. Organizational slack is the ratio of 
current assets over current liability. Firm size and organizational slack indicate the firm’s 
capability to respond with an action response, and thus may influence the manager’s 
decision to use a word response. In addition, firm size and organizational slack may be 
highly correlated with firm reputation, so it is important to include them in the model. 
Firm media visibility captures the public attention garnered by a firm (Pfarrer et 
al., 2010). Similar to firm reputation, I adopted a dichotomous measure for firm media 
visibility (high vs. low). It is measured through the total number of news articles that 
mentioned about the firm in a given year in RavenPack. If a firm is at the top quartile of 
sampled firms for the number of published articles, it is coded as 1 (i.e., high media 
visibility). Other firms are coded as 0 (i.e., low media visibility).  Because word 
responses are public statements published by major news channels, I want to remove the 
publishing bias, that is, some firms are favored by the media while others are not.  
CEO-Level Controls 
For CEO-level control variables, I include age and background. CEO age is 
measured in years. CEO age may also influence the likelihood of a word response, 
because age reflects risk propensity. CEO background notes the presence of a 
technological background (with a Bachelor degree in Science vs. Arts). In the CE 
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industry, many CEOs have technical backgrounds and many have business backgrounds. 
It is possible that CEOs with technical backgrounds are less vocal and thus less likely to 
use word responses to deter rivalry.  
Controls of Competitive Moves 
Since I argue word-based moves are different from action-based moves and focus 
on exploring the antecedents of word responses, I include word action from the attacker 
as a control variable. I also consider the rivalry/competitive environment of response is 
important to study the occurrence of word response, so I control actions by rivals in 
markets in the past 14 days, actions by the responder in markets in the past 14 days, 
word-based moves by rivals in markets in the past 14 days, word-based moves by the 
responder in markets in the past 14 days. I chose 14 days because 90% of the firms 
respond within 14 days. For robustness check, I control 7 days and 21 days separately.  
4.4 Overview of Statistical Analysis 
Cox proportional hazards regression models are employed to test the hypotheses 
generated from the theoretical model of word response with the occurrence of word 
response comprising the outcome (dependent variable). 
Early CD studies have used ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to model the 
time between an action and a response (Chen et al., 1992). However, OLS can suffer the 
issue of right censoring and cannot rigorously capture the non-response situation in a 
finite time window (Yu & Cannella, 2007). The right censoring is likely to bias the 
coefficient estimates downward. Event history analysis (Allison, 1984) can resolve the 
right censoring problem by not modeling the response time but the hazard rate (Ferrier et 
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al., 1999). In this study, the hazard rate is the likelihood that a word response can be 
observed at time t, given that no response occurred prior to t. Because the event history 
approach models a conditional likelihood, it does not suffer from the right-censoring 
issue.  
The unit of analysis of my study is the dyad-market (the actor-responder-market), 
and the failure event is the occurrence of a word response. The aim is to determine how 
the occurrence and timing of word responses depends on several covariates (independent 
variables). A firm becomes at risk of responding with words when a rival initiates an 
action or word attack in the market where the focal firm also competes. This approach is 
different from a matching approach that identifies a target responder for each attack. I 
treat any firm that competes at the focal market as rival, following the “focal-market-rival” 
approach (Gimeno & Woo, 1999).  
Starting on the date of the first action or word action taken by either dyad 
competitor after January 1, 2007, I stop the current observation and start a new 
observation under the following conditions: (1) the attacker initiates another action or 
word action (with no response to the first action); (2) the responder responds with action 
(with no word response to the first action); or (3) the responder responds with words. I 
code the first two cases as “censored”, and the third case as “failure”. In addition, I set up 
a window of 46 days (99% of firms respond within 46 days) and censor the case if there 
is no response within the window.  
For my study, it is crucial that event history analysis can also address right-
censoring of action response, as well as non-response.  According to Allison, when there 
are multiple events, “you don’t’ need to estimate models for all event types unless you 
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really want to” (Allison, 2010, p. 206). Since I am only interested in the effects of 
covariates on word responses, I can simply estimate a single model of word responses, 
and treat other response types as censored. 
I further consider semi-parametric Cox proportional hazards regression models 
are more suitable than parametric models to my study because they are more flexible. 
Cox models allow researchers to make inferences on the effects of covariates on hazard 
rates without assumption of the baseline hazard function for word responses. Cox models 
assume that hazard rates are proportional over time, that is, the effect of each covariate on 
hazard rate is the same at any points in time if conditions are controlled (Allison, 2010).  
The Cox proportional hazards model can be written as: 
ℎ(𝑡) = ℎ0(𝑡)𝑒
𝛽1𝑥1+⋯+𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘 
where ℎ0(𝑡) is the baseline hazard, unspecified. 
In addition, because there are repeated failure events (i.e., word responses) for the 
same firm, the error variance may not be independent. Unobserved heterogeneity may 
induce autocorrelation (Wooldridge, 2002). Therefore, I clustered robust standard errors 
by responding firm ID to improve the efficiency of the model.  
 
4.5 SUMMARY 
This chapter describes why I chose the CE industry, how I selected the 20 major 
CE manufacturers, how I identified actions and word actions, how I measured those 
proposed antecedents of word responses, and what analytical method I used in this study. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS 
In this chapter, I first report the descriptive statistics of my sample and then 
present the results of analyses used to test my hypotheses. 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Appendix A reports the descriptive statistics of variables used in this study, 
including means, standard deviations, and correlations. Modest correlations among 
variables reduce the concern of multicollinearity. To test multicollinearity, I ran OLS 
regressions with the full model including all interactions to generate variance inflation 
factors (VIF). I found that no variable had a VIF greater than 3, a value well below the 
recommended ceiling of 10 (Chatterjee & Price, 1991). Therefore, I conclude that 
multicollinearity is not a concern in my study. 
Based on the dataset of competitive move (2943 competitive moves in total), I 
constructed a dataset using the actor-responder-market as the unit of analysis. The total 
number of observations is 37,535 across eight years (2007-2014), including non-response 
33,813 (censored at 46-day window, 90.08%), action-response 2,875 (7.66%), and word-
response 847 (2.26%). The response ratio lower than 10% is reasonable because we treat 
all competitors that have market existence in the attacked market as potential responders 
(i.e., risk set). 
Figure 3 visually presented the distribution of word responses and action 
responses in the eight CE markets. Among 847 word responses from my 20 sampling 
firms between 2007 and 2014, there are 172 word responses (20.3%) in the computer and 
peripherals market, 209 word responses (24.7%) in the mobile phone market, 178 word 
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responses (21%) in the television market, 44 word responses (5.2%) in the home audio 
market, 44 word responses (5.2%) in the video player market, 55 word responses (6.5%) 
in the imaging device market, 99 word responses (11.7%) in the portable player market, 
and 46 word responses (5.4%) in the in-car entertainment market. 
Figure 4 depicts the smoothed hazard functions for word responses, which reveals 
the nature of the underlying baseline hazard function for the event of interest. That is 
firms are more likely to use word responses right after the attack, and the likelihood 
decreases over time.  To test the hypotheses, I use a semi-parametric Cox model that does 
not make assumptions about the shape of the hazard function. The shape of hazard could 
be increasing, decreasing, constant, or anything else.  
To test the proportional hazard assumption, I include the interactions of time 
dependent covariates and time in the Cox model, and there was no significance for any of 
those interactions. Therefore, I concluded that the proportional hazard assumption is not 
violated. 
5.2 Results of Hypothesis Testing 
Appendix B presents the results of Cox proportional hazards model for my 
hypothesis testing. The coefficients in Appendix B are odds ratios. Odds ratios—
exponentiated coefficients—represent the change in likelihood of word responses with a 
1-unit change in the corresponding covariate. Odds ratios above 1 indicate positive 
relationships between covariates and the likelihood of word responses, while odds ratios 
below 1 indicate negative relationships between covariates and the likelihood of word 
responses. If the odds ratio equals 1, it means no effect.  
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Model 1 includes control variables only. Model 2 includes the main effects 
(Hypothesis 1-6).  Model 3-Model 8 include interaction effects separately. Model 9 is the 
full model. 
Model 2 (the main effects model) shows an improvement in model fit over Model 
1 (the baseline model). A likelihood ratio test is used to compare the two models.  Model 
2 provided a better fit to the data than did the baseline model  (𝜒2=55.25, p < 0.01)5.  
5.2.1 Under What Situations Are Responders Motivated to Use Word Responses? 
Based on the action-response perspective, Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 are developed to 
explore four typical characteristics of the action, the market and the actor—action type, 
market dependence, multimarket contact, and competitive aggressiveness of the actor.  
Hypothesis 1 suggests that when the initiating action is a strategic action, firms 
are more likely to use word responses. To test the hypothesis, I measure the action type as 
a dummy variable (1 strategic action, 0 non-strategic action). Appendix B provides 
support for Hypothesis 1.  The odds ratio in Model 2 is 1.344 (p < 0.05). This suggests 
that when the attack is a strategic action, firms are 34.4% more likely to respond with 
words.   
Hypothesis 2 argues that when the attacked market is important to the responder, 
the responding firm is more likely to use word responses. Market dependence is 
measured as the proportion of the firm’s sales in the attacked market in the year the attack 
was taken. Model 2 shows that Hypothesis 2 is strongly supported. The odds ratio is 
                                                 
5I used the likelihood ratio test for cox models without clustered standard error since Stata considers “LR 
test likely invalid for models with robust vce”. I aslo used Wald test to test the difference between Model 2 
and Model 1 with clustered standard error. The results show that Model 2 (the main effects model) is a 
better fit than the baseline model (𝜒2=171.04, p < 0.01). 
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1.010 (p < 0.01), which means that a 1% increase in market dependence is associated 
with 1% increase of likelihood in observing the occurrence of word response.  
Hypothesis 3 suggests that when the responder and rivals compete simultaneously 
in multiple markets, we are more likely to observe word responses. High level of 
Multimarket Contact (MMC) indicates a high level of overlapping markets between the 
responder and other rivals in the market. Appendix B provides support for Hypothesis 3. 
The odds ratio is 1.493 (p < 0.05). This suggests that firms are 49.3% more likely to 
respond with words if there is one-unit increase in MMC. 
Hypothesis 4 argues that if the actor is very aggressive, firms are less likely to use 
word responses. Aggressiveness of the actor is measured by action volume and action 
complexity. To test this hypothesis, I include firm size, firm reputation and organizational 
slack of the actor as control variables. Appendix B indicates that Hypothesis 4 is not 
supported.  
5.2.2 What Kinds of Responders Are More Likely to Use Word Responses? 
 To answer the second research question, I focus on three firm/CEO characteristics 
that are well studied in strategic management but less studied in competitive dynamics—
firm reputation, CEO tenure, and CEO duality. 
 Hypothesis 5 suggests the firm reputation of the responder is positively associated 
with the likelihood of word response. Firm reputation is measured as a dummy variable. 
Since firm reputation may be related to many other firm characteristics, I controlled for 
three important characteristics of the responder—firm size, firm visibility, and 
organizational slack. Model 2 shows that Hypothesis 5 is not supported.  
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 Hypothesis 6 predicts that CEOs who stay in their positions for a longer time tend 
to use word responses. Hypothesis 7 predicts that CEOs who are also the chair of board 
are more likely to use word responses. To test these hypotheses, I include CEO tenure 
and CEO duality as independent variables. Hypothesis 6 and Hypothesis 7 are not 
supported. CEO duality is found to be negatively associated with the likelihood of word 
response with hazard ratio of 0.539 (p <0.01). It suggests that dual CEOs are 46.1% (1-
53.9%) less likely to use word responses. 
 Hypotheses 8a, 8b, 8c, 9a, 9b, and 9c predict the moderation effect of CEO tenure 
and CEO duality on word responses. I argue that CEO tenure and CEO duality may 
strengthen the effects of strategic action, market dependence, and MMC on word 
responses. Interactions are added in Model 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 separately. Model 9 is full 
model with all interactions.  
Appendix B shows that only Hypothesis 8b is supported. The odds ratio is 1.001 
(p < 0.05), indicating a positive moderation effect. The positive interaction is 
demonstrated by the slopes in Figure 5. The increase in hazard of word response 
associated with market dependence is stronger for long-tenured CEOs. In other words, 
although we do not know whether CEOs with long tenure are more likely to respond with 
words, they are more likely to do so if an important market of the responder is attacked. 
This hypothesis is supported.  For Hypothesis 8c, it is interesting to find that CEO with 
longer tenure are less likely to respond with words if the actor and the responder have 
high level of MMC. The moderation effect of CEO tenure on the relationship between 
MMC and likelihood of word response is negative and significant (odds ratio=0.963, p < 
0.05). This is opposite from what I expected.  
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5.2.3 Other Findings 
There are some interesting findings based on the control variables shown in 
Appendix B.   
Since I argue that word-based moves should be different from action-based moves, 
I consider it is important to include word action from the attacker as a control variable. In 
Model 2, the odds ratio is 1.417 (p < 0.05), which means when the initiating competitive 
moves are word attacks, firms are 41.7% more likely to use words to respond. 
Chen and Hambrick’s (1995) study showed that firm size was also an important 
factor in competitive dynamics. They found that small firms initiated more actions and 
with faster speed, but they are less responsive to action attack and slower to respond. In 
my study, large firms are found to be 20.9% (p < 0.10) more likely to use word responses 
than small firms in Model 2. 
In regard to competitive context of word responses, I found that if the responding 
firms are more active in action-based moves in the past 14 days, they are more likely to 
use words to respond. The odds ratio is 1.335 (p < 0.05) in Model 1 (baseline model with 
only control variables) and 1.241 (p < 0.05) in Model 2 (the main effect model). Model 1 
in Appendix B also shows that firms are more active in word-based moves in the past 14 
days are 20.9% (p<0.10) more likely to use word responses. But the significant effect 
disappears in Model 2.  
5.3 Robustness Check 
In this section, I conduct several robustness checks, including multinomial logistic 
regression, competitive contexts with different length of period as control variables, 
controlling for market concentration and removing window censoring. 
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5.3.1 Multinomial-logistic Regressions  
Multinomial logistic regressions simultaneously estimate the likelihood of 
observing multiple outcomes. I coded non-response as 0, action response as 1, and word 
response as 2. Appendix C shows the results of the multinomial logit model for action 
response and word response, with non-response as the base comparison group. Model 1 is 
the main effects model. I added interactions into Model 2-Model 7 separately. Model 8 is 
the full model with all interactions.   
The results of the Cox models are supported in the multinomial logit model in 
general. Same as the Cox model, the effects of strategic action, market dependence, and 
MMC are positive and significant on word responses. Different from the Cox model, 
Hypothesis 4 is supported (𝛽=-0.081, p<0.01) in this multinomial logit model. When the 
actor has recently been very aggressive in the past, responding firms are less likely to use 
word responses.  
5.3.2 Different Competitive Contexts  
As I mentioned, I chose 14 days for measuring competitive context of word 
response because 90% of firms respond with words or actions within 14 days. Here, I test 
the Cox model with two different length of period: 7 days and 21 days. The results of 
main effects and interactions for 14 days are robust in the models for different 
competitive contexts.  
5.3.3 Controlling Market Concentration 
 As I mentioned, my model of word response is most appropriate in oligopolistic 
settings. I included market concentration variable into my Cox model to check the 
robustness of the results. I used Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to measure market 
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concentration, which is the sum of the squared market shares of firms in a given market. 
High HHI indicates a few large firms in the market, while low HHI indicates a large 
number of small firms in the market. The effect of market concentration on word 
response is significant in Model1 (odds ratio=4.001, p<0.05) and not significant in other 
models. Other results are similar to my main analysis (see Appendix D).   
5.3.4 Other Robustness Checks  
In this study, I set up a window of 46 days for my primary analysis because 99% 
of firms respond within 46 days, and then censor the case if there is no response within 
the window. I tested the Cox model again without the 46 days window, and the results are 
robust.  
 I also tested an alternative measure of MMC, the dyad-level measure, in the Cox 
models. Results are similar. 
5.4 SUMMARY 
This chapter presents the empirical evidence about the antecedents of word 
responses. Appendix B presents a summary of results for the Cox proportional hazard 
model.  Regarding the characteristics of the action, the market, and the actor, I find that 
firms are more likely to use word responses (1) when the initiating action is a strategic 
action, (2) when an important market is attacked, and (3) when the responding firm has 
multiple markets overlapped with the attacker. Regarding the characteristics of the 
responder, different from what I expected, dual CEOs are less likely to use word 
responses. For the moderation effect, I find that long-tenured CEOs are more likely to use 
words to respond, if the responder relies highly on the attacked market. 
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I also present some interesting findings for control variables. Firms are more 
likely to use words to respond to word attacks; larger firms are more likely to use word 
responses; when responders are very active in actions in the recent past, they are more 
likely to use word responses.   
Four robustness checks are conducted, including multinomial logit model. The 
results are robust in general. A further discussion will be presented in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
This chapter is organized as follows. First, I summarize the study and discuss the 
overall results related to hypotheses testing. Next, I outline my contributions made to the 
literature and managerial implications. Finally, I discuss the limitations of my study as 
well future research directions.  
6.1 Summary and Discussion 
In this study, I argue that word response is different from action response and 
non-response, and it is an important phenomenon to study. Word response refers to a 
specific and public statement of strategic intention.  On the one hand, word response is 
not cheap talk that is costless to firms because it is public and there may be long-term 
cost such as firm reputation. On the other hand, word response is not action response that 
already occurred or will occur with certainty. Word responses carry some commitment 
and also some uncertainty. According to Porter’s (1980) perspective of competitive 
signaling, word response is a type of competitive signal that should not be ignored by 
competitors. The primary objective of using word response is to reduce the intensity of 
rivalry in order to achieve above-average return.  
This paper is the first study to empirically investigate the phenomenon of word 
response, driven by two fundamental questions—under what situations firms are likely to 
respond with words and what kind of responders are likely to respond with words. In this 
study, I focus on some important characteristic of the action, the actor, the market, and 
the responder based on the action-response perspective, the cornerstone of many 
competitive dynamics studies. The antecedents I am interested in include action 
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type/strategic action, market dependence, multimarket contact, aggressiveness of the 
actor, firm reputation of the responder, CEO tenure of the responder, and CEO duality of 
the responder.  
My selection of those antecedents is also based on the Awareness-Motivation-
Capability (AMC) perspective, a dominant framework in recent competitive dynamics 
studies. According to the AMC framework, firms are more likely to respond if they are 
aware of rival’s move, motivated to respond, and capable to respond (Chen, 1996).  
Regarding motivation, I focus on situations under which firms or CEOs may not be 
motivated to escalate rivalry, such as strategic action, market dependence, multimarket 
contact and CEO tenure. Regarding capability, I focus on situations under which firms or 
CEOs may have more/less capability to use word response to deter rivalry, such as 
aggressiveness of the actor, firm reputation of the responder, and CEO duality of the 
responder.  
Because the phenomenon I am interested in is the occurrence of word responses 
and that OLS may be biased by right censoring, I use event history analysis to test the 
effects of characteristics of the action, the market, the actor, and the responder. 
Particularly, I chose the Cox proportional hazard model due to the flexibility of a semi-
parametric model over parametric models, that is, we do not need to assume any 
particular shape of the baseline hazard function of word responses. The results from Cox 
regressions are also upheld when I use a multinomial logit approach, which 
simultaneously estimates the multiple outcome of non-response (base outcome), action 
response, and word response.  
As I expected, I found that firms are more likely to use word responses when the 
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initiating action is strategic action. Previous literature suggests that firms are less likely to 
respond to strategic action with action responses (e.g., Chen et al., 1992; Smith et al., 
1991). I argue that strategic action also represents important opportunity to create 
competitive advantage but firms need more time to allocate resource for action response 
because a strategic action involves a significant commitment of resources and is very 
difficult to interpret and implement. Word response can be a strategic tool for the 
responding firm to deliver its intention to respond. It may deter rivalry because it carries 
some commitment and is quick to implement. In the multinomial logit model (Appendix 
C), results show that action responses are different from word responses, although the 
negative relationship between strategic action and action response is not significant.  
As I expected, firms are more likely to use word responses when important 
markets are attacked. Under such situation, previous literature suggests that firms are 
motivated to respond because they feel directly threatened and the market share is eroded 
by the attack (Chen & MacMillan, 1992; Chen et al., 1992). My argument is consistent 
with Chen and MacMillan’s hypothesis that market dependence is negatively associated 
with the likelihood of non-response. I further argue that although firms are motivated to 
respond to declare their territory or “home turf”, they are not motivated to escalate the 
competition in important markets considering its significant cost.  Chen and colleagues’ 
(1992) study presented a finding that was different from what they expected—firms 
respond with action slower when their important markets are attacked. This may be 
explained by such concern of escalation of competition at key markets. Because of this 
concern, firms may use a word response to send out a warning signal first to declare their 
territory. This hypothesis is supported in the Cox model and the multinomial logit model. 
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Results of multinomial logit models also show that market dependence is positively 
associated with the likelihood of action response.  
As I expected, firms are more likely to respond with word responses when the 
responder competes with the actor simultaneously in multiple markets. Previous 
multimarket competition literature suggested a negative relationship between MMC and 
rivalry intensity (Baum & Korn, 1996; Boeker et al., 1997; Yu et al., 2009) or inverted U-
shaped relationship between MMC and rivalry intensity (Gimeno & Woo, 1999; 
Jayachandran et al., 1999). Meanwhile, some studies indicated a positive relationship 
between MMC and action response speed (Young et al., 2000; Yu & Cannella, 2007). 
They argued that firms with more MMC with the actor have more incentives to enforce 
the norm of  “mutual forbearance”. Building on the literature of multimarket competition, 
I further argue that firms with more MMC are motivated to send out a signal to restore 
the mutual forbearance but are not motivated to escalate the competition because a 
competitive war across multiple markets is very costly. Word response can be such a 
strategic tool to help the responding firm tone down the rivalry with the attacker. Results 
from multinomial logit models show that word responses are different from action 
responses. Appendix C shows that the positive relationship between MMC and action 
response is not supported, while the positive relationship between MMC and word 
response is strongly supported. 
Different from what I expected, the effect of firm reputation on the likelihood of 
word response is not significant. Results from the multinomial logit model show that firm 
reputation is positively related with the likelihood of action response. This may imply 
that firms with high reputation tend to use action responses to protect their reputation but 
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word responses may not be able to perform that function. More interestingly, results from 
multinomial logit models show that CEO tenure of the responder is positively related 
with action response, but negatively related with word response. An alternative 
explanation is that CEOs who stay in their positions longer may prefer a simple and 
effective way to deter rivalry, which is action response not word response. Furthermore, 
in the multinomial logit models, CEO duality is negatively associated with both action 
responses and word responses. It is possible that dual CEOs are less responsive to 
competitor’s moves because they care less about rivalry deterrence.  
6.2 Research and Managerial Implications 
6.2.1 Research Implications 
This study makes several contributions to the current strategic management 
literature. First, I contribute to the action-response perspective, a cornerstone of 
competitive dynamics research. Previous literature on the action-response perspective 
assumes that firms do nothing if they do not respond with actions. I challenge that 
assumption and argue that firms may also respond with words. Word response can be 
treated as a response outcome that is different from action response, because word 
response involves low commitments and is quick to implement. Meanwhile, word 
responses may be ambiguous, hard to interpret, and less effective than action responses to 
deter rivalry. As the first attempt to empirically investigate word response, my study 
tested some important characteristics of the action, the market, the actor, and the 
responder based on the action-response perspective. I found that a firm was more likely 
to use word response when the attack was a strategic action, when its important market is 
attacked, or when it competes with the actor simultaneously across multiple markets.     
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I also contribute to the AMC perspective, a dominant framework in recent 
competitive dynamics studies. Previous research using the AMC perspective argues that 
firms will respond if they are aware of the attack, motivates to respond and capable to 
respond. I extend the AMC perspective by digging deeper into the motivation and the 
capability components. I argue that when firms are motivated to respond (e.g. a threat) 
and capable to respond with action, it is still possible that firms are not motivated to 
respond with action because of the concern of escalating competition.  It is also possible 
that firms can still respond (with words) when they are motivated to respond with action 
but need more time to allocate resources or figure out the true intention of the attacker. 
Word responses provide an alternative tool for firms to influence rival’s perception and 
competitive behavior.  
Besides competitive dynamics literature, my study also sheds light on the 
literature of the strategic use of public language, such as impression management. 
Previous literature on impression management has been focused on how firms 
strategically use public language to influence external stakeholders to gain their support 
and legitimacy, especially when the image of a firm is threatened.  My study extend the 
impression management perspective into competitive settings by arguing firms can use 
language to influence competitor’s perception even though there is direct conflict of 
interests among competitors. For example, in this study, I argue that top managers can 
strategically use language to declare territory of home market or restore mutual 
forbearance.   
6.2.2 Managerial Implications 
We often observe that top managers use language in public to influence 
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competition. But meanwhile, top managers may be concerned that “talk is cheap” among 
competitors. From this study of 20 major CE manufacturers between 2007-2014, I found 
that firms are more likely to use words to respond under certain situations.  It is important 
for top managers to know that word response can be a powerful and cost-effective tool in 
competition.  On the one side, I suggest managers to take advantage of word response for 
its quickness to respond and low commitment on resources, especially when the firm has 
high dependence on the attacked market or high interdependence with the actor. On the 
other side, managers should be aware of the cost of word response. Reckless use of word 
responses may cause the firm problems in the future, considering firm reputation and the 
credibility of top managers. Overall, considering the characteristics of word response, it 
is likely for top managers to build up an advantage over competitors by proactively using 
language in competition and being responsive/sensitive to word-based moves from rivals.   
6.3 Limitations and Extensions 
6.3.1 Limitations  
There are several limitations for my study. First, although the research setting of 
consumer electronics (CE) is a desirable setting to study word-based moves according to 
the reasons I mentioned in Chapter 4, there are also limitations regarding this research 
setting. For example, the generalizability of this study’s results may not be extended to 
industries where firms/top managers are relatively “quiet”, such as coal and legal service 
industries.  Also, similar to other competitive dynamics studies, my framework of word 
response is most appropriate in oligopolistic settings where firms are highly dependent on 
each other. The results of this study may not hold in industries where the interdependence 
among firms is low.   
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In addition, because of the environmental dynamism of the CE industry, market 
sectors are evolving relatively quickly. Different from typical research settings of 
competitive dynamics like the airline industry with a single market, the CE industry has 
eight market sectors. Those market sectors might change in the future. There may be new 
market sectors (e.g., the emergent market of wearables) and market boundaries may 
become blurred over time. It is important to know that when market sectors change or the 
boundary between markets becomes more and more ambiguous, it is hard for the 
competitors to detect a move and identify the move as a threat or opportunity.  
The second limitation is about my data sources. Top managers/firms talk in public 
via multiple channels, such as newspaper, magazine, television, conference call, firm 
websites, annual reports and social media. I capture word-based moves mainly based on 
RavenPack and supplemented the data with Factiva and firm websites. It is possible that I 
missed some word-based moves in other public channels. For example, some CEOs from 
my sampling firms have their own twitter accounts, such as Amazon CEO Jeff Benzos, 
Apple CEO Tim Cook, Dell CEO Michael Dell, and etc. Future studies may collect 
multiple sources of word responses to test hypotheses.  
Another limitation is my measure of word response. I identify word responses 
based on the temporal sequence, following Ferrier, Smith and Grimm (1999) and Yu and 
Cannella (2007). I consider word response as a rival’s word-based move that occurs after 
the initiating action (i.e., attack). The limitation of the temporal sequence approach of 
response is that the response may not match with the attack because the response may 
mention what attack it is responding to.  
Another approach of measuring response is based on matching, following Chen and 
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colleagues (Chen & MacMillan, 1992). Researchers from this approach usually identify 
response first by using keywords like “in response to” and “responding to”, and then 
trace back to the mentioned attack. The problem of this matching approach is that (1) 
majority of competitive moves do not mention the corresponding attack explicitly, and (2) 
all observations for this approach always have an outcome of responses and we cannot 
capture non-response. Therefore, comparing those two approaches, I consider the 
temporal sequence measure of response is more appropriate for my study, but it has its 
own limitations.  
6.3.2 Extensions 
This study offers several possible research opportunities for scholars who are 
interested in studying language in competition.  
First, regarding the antecedents of language in competition, this study opens doors 
for scholar to explore other antecedents of word response. Especially considering that 
most hypotheses associated with the responder characteristics (i.e., firm reputation, CEO 
tenure, and CEO duality) are not supported in this study, scholars may explore more 
about what kind of responders are more likely to use word responses and how are CEO 
characteristics associated with their strategic use of language in competition.  
Furthermore, while this study is focused on word responses, another important 
word-based move, word action, has not been studied. My empirical findings showed a 
positive relationship between word action and word response. Future studies are 
encouraged to explore whether the underlying mechanism behind word actions is 
different from word responses.  For example, as Chen (1996) argued, the effects of MMC 
on action and response are opposite. While firms with high MMC are less likely to 
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initiate an action attack, they are more likely to respond with actions. Also, Rindova’s 
(2004) study suggested that words like “war” and “win” can be used to escalate 
competition in order to marshal support and resources form stakeholders. Therefore, it is 
very likely that the motivation of using word actions is very different from those of word 
responses.    
Second, regarding the content of language in competition, future studies may 
explore more characteristics of word responses. There could be different types of word 
responses. Based on functions, some can be used to seek more information, some to 
appeal for cooperation, and some can be threatening signals. By integrating with 
impression management theory, scholars can also explore different types of framing of 
word responses.  For example, it would be interesting to study how do firms use word 
responses that appeal to institutional logic as a way to gain support from other 
competitors and challenge the legitimacy of attacker’s action. 
Third, more research opportunities exist regarding the outcome of language in 
competition. As the first empirical study to explore the event of word response, I focus on 
one outcome—the likelihood of the event. Future studies can explore more response 
characteristics like response time and sequence. For example, researchers may investigate 
what factors influence the speed of word response and under what situations a word 
response is followed by its corresponding action response. Future studies may also study 
the consequences of word responses. After studying the occurrence of the event, scholars 
may explore more about the effectiveness of word responses (e.g. rivalry deterrence) and 
its contingencies, such as the credibility of the responding firms. 
In summary, building on the traditional action-response perspective and Porter’s 
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perspective of competitive signaling, this dissertation develops a framework to 
understand word responses, a phenomenon that we often observe but do not know why it 
occurs. I contribute not only to competitive dynamics literature but also organizational 
studies on the strategic use of language. The empirical findings and the limitation of this 
study also offer interesting research opportunities in the future. 
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Table 1  
Major CE Manufacturers 
1 Acer Inc 
2 Amazon.com Inc 
3 Apple Inc 
4 Canon Inc 
5 Dell Inc 
6 Fuji Photo Film Co 
7 Garmin Ltd 
8 Hewlett-Packard Development Co LP 
9 JVC Kenwood Corp 
10 Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV 
11 Lenovo Group Ltd 
12 LG Corp 
13 Nikon Corp 
14 Nokia Corp 
15 Panasonic Corp 
16 Pioneer Corp 
17 Samsung Corp 
18 Sharp Corp 
19 Sony Corp 
20 TomTom International BV 
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Table 2  
Key Studies about the Antecedents of Action Response 
Actor 
Characteristics 
Action 
Characteristics 
Environmental/Market 
Characteristics 
Responder 
Characteristics 
Market share leader 
(Smith et al, 1992; 
Derfus et al, 2008) 
Visibility (MacMillan 
et al, 1985; Chen and 
Miller, 1994) 
Emerging/fragmented/mature 
industry (Smith et al, 1992) 
Structural complexity 
(Smith et al, 1991) 
TMT tenure (Smith et 
al, 1992) 
Perceived potential 
(Macmillan et al, 
1985) 
Industry concentration 
(Ferrier et al, 2002; Derfus et 
al, 2008) 
External orientation 
(Smith et al, 1991) 
History as price-cutter 
(Smith et al, 1992) 
Threat of action 
(Macmillan et al, 
1985; Smith et al, 
1992 Chen and 
MacMillan, 1992; 
Chen, Smith, and 
Grimm, 1992; Chen 
and Miller, 1994) 
Industry growth (Ferrier et 
al, 2002; Derfus et al, 2008) 
Organizational slack 
(Smith et al, 1991) 
History as strategic 
player (Smith et al, 
1992) 
Radicality 
(MacMillan et al, 
1985; Smith et al, 
1992) 
Barrier to entry (Ferrier et al, 
2002) 
TMT education 
(Smith et al, 1991) 
  Strategic vs. Tactical 
(Smith et al, 1991; 
Smith et al, 1992; 
Chen, Smith, and 
Grimm, 1992) 
  TMT experience 
(Smith et al, 1991) 
  Action Scope (Smith 
et al, 1992; Chen, 
Smith, and Grimm, 
1992) 
  Firm size (Chen and 
Hambrick, 1995) 
  Complexity 
(MacMillan et al, 
1985; Chen and 
Miller, 1994) 
  TMT heterogeneity 
(Hambrick, Cho, and 
Chen, 1996; Ferrier, 
2002) 
  Implementation 
requirement of action 
(Smith et al, 1992; 
Chen, Smith, and 
Grimm, 1992; Chen 
and Miller, 1994) 
   Managerial cognitive 
framework of 
strategic importance 
(Marcel et al, 2011) 
  Irreversibility (Chen 
and MacMillan, 1992; 
Chen et al, 2002) 
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Table 3  
Key Studies about Action/Response and Consequences 
 Action/Response 
Focal Firm 
Performance 
Rival Firm 
Performance 
Smith, Grimm, and 
Gannon (1992) 
Speed of action 
Financial performance 
(+) 
  
Order of action 
Financial performance 
(-) 
  
Chen and Miller (1994) Number of actions   
Financial 
performance of 
first mover (-) 
Miller and Chen (1994) 
Competitive inertia 
Financial performance 
(+) 
  
Competitive 
inertia*Market diversity 
Financial performance 
(-) 
  
Young, Smith, and 
Grimm (1996) 
Firm activity 
Financial performance 
(+) 
  
Miller and Chen (1996) Competitive simplicity 
Financial performance 
(-) 
  
Lee, Smith, Grimm, and 
Schomburg (2000) 
Speed of action (first, 
second mover) 
Financial performance 
(+) 
  
Speed of action   
Financial 
performance of 
first mover (-) 
Ferrier (2001) 
Number of actions Market share gain (+)   
Duration of actions Market share gain (+)   
Ferrier and Lyon (2004) 
Competitive 
simplicity*TMT 
heterogeneity 
    
Derfus, Maggitti, 
Grimm, and Smith 
(2008) 
Number of actions 
Financial performance 
(+) 
  
Number/speed of actions   
Financial 
performance (-) 
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Table 4  
Key Studies about the Effect of MMC and Rivalry Intensity 
MMC Rivalry Intensity Contingencies 
Baum and Korn (1996) Negative relationship between MMC 
and rivalry intensity (e.g firm market 
entries and market exits) 
Market concentration 
(not supported) and 
sphere of influence 
Boeker , Goodstein, 
Stephan, and Murmann 
(1997) 
Negative relationship between MMC 
and market exits 
  
Baum and Korn (1999) Inverted U-shaped relationship 
between MMC and rivalry intensity 
(e.g firm market entries and market 
exits) 
Competitor’s relative 
size (partially 
supported) 
Gimeno and Woo 
(1999) 
Negative relationship between MMC 
and rivalry intensity  
Resource-sharing 
opportunities 
Gimeno (1999) Negative relationship between MMC 
and rivalry intensity  
Type of MMC 
(reciprocal or not), 
sphere of influence 
Jayachandran, Gimeno, 
and Varadarajan (1999) 
Inverted U-shaped relationship 
between MMC and firm market 
entries 
Sphere of influence, 
resource similarity, 
organizational culture, 
Seller concentration 
Haveman and 
Nonnemaker (2000) 
Inverted U-shaped relationship 
between MMC and rivalry intensity  
Market concentration  
Young, Smith, Grimm, 
and Simon (2000) 
Negative relationship between MMC 
and action initiation; 
Resource similarity 
Positive relationship between MMC 
and speed of action responses 
Resource similarity 
Scott (2001) Positive relationship between MMC 
and cross-citations between two firms 
  
Stephan, Murmann, 
Boeker, and Goodstein 
(2003) 
Inverted U-shaped relationship 
between MMC and rivalry intensity  
CEO tenure and New 
CEO 
Funentelsaz and Gomez 
(2006) 
Inverted U-shaped between MMC and 
firm market entries 
Strategic similarity, 
sphere of influence, 
market concentration 
Yu and Cannella (2007) Positive relationship between MMC 
and speed of action responses 
  
Yu, Subramaniam, and 
Cannella (2009) 
Negative relationship between MMC 
and rivalry intensity (i.e., competitive 
aggressiveness) 
Subsidiary ownership, 
cultural distance, 
regulatory restriction, 
and presence of local 
competitors 
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Figure 4  
Smoothed Hazard Function for Word Responses 
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Figure 5  
The Multiplier Effect of the Word Response Rate 
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       Descriptive Statistics (Continued) 
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      Descriptive Statistics (Continued) 
 
        Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * p <0.10; **p <0.05; ***p <0.01. 
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APPENDIX B 
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         Results of Cox Proportional Hazards Model for Word Response 
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      Results of Cox Proportional Hazards Model for Word Response (Continued) 
        Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by responders. * p <0.10; **p <0.05; ***p <0.01. 
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      Results of Multinomial Logit Model for Action Response and Word Response 
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Results of Multinomial Logit Model for Action Response and Word Response (Continued)
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      Results of Multinomial Logit Model for Action Response and Word Response (Continued) 
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Results of Multinomial Logit Model for Action Response and Word Response (Continued) 
 
 
 
Note: AR is action response; WR is word response; N= 35797; standard errors are in parentheses. In the model, standard errors are not clustered because 
some standard errors are missing after clustering. But the results are similar with the multinomial logit models with clustered standard errors. 
* p <0.10; **p <0.05; ***p <0.01. 
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            Results of Cox Regressions with Market Concentration 
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      Results of Cox Regressions with Market Concentration (Continued) 
 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by responders. * p <0.10; **p <0.05; ***p <0.01. 
 
 
